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Reports 94/11 • Statistics Norway 1994
This report is the result of a project undertaken by the Research Department of Statistics Norway to recapitulate the
impact of economic policy on macroeconomic development in Mozambique. A brief review of the historical and
economic origins of the structural adjustment paradigm is offered in the first chapter, whereas the second chapter
contains a survey of the background and theoretical content of monetarism in development economics. The post-
independence economic policy of Mozambique is reviewed in the third chapter.
A panel data set containing monetary macroeconomic indicators for ten countries in sub-Saharan Africa over the
period 1980 to 1991 is presented and commented in the fourth chapter. Finally, a simple single-equation econome-
tric model of economic growth is constructed and simulated to test and illustrate some hypotheses concerning mone-
tarism and structural adjustment. The results seem to suggest a significant, but very modest spill-over from monetary
to real economic variables. These results are probably due to the regulated macroeconomic environment which has
been quite typical for developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
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1. Introduction*
1.1 Overview
This report represents the final documentation of a project
undertaken by the Research Department of Statistics Nor-
way to recapitulate the impact of the late macroeconomic
policy in Mozambique, with sidelong glances and compari-
sons to the development of other economies in the region.
The time span of primary interest is the period after 1987, in
order to evaluate the effects of the structural adjustment
plan implemented in cooperation with the multinational
donor community
The introduction offers a brief retrospect of the history of
monetarism as a school of thought within development
economics. Various attempts to evaluate the impact of struc-
tural adjustment are then reviewed. The general conclusion
from empirical research on the area is that the structural ad-
justment programs seem to have had moderate beneficiary
effects when all adjustors are included in the data set. How-
ever, this conclusion soon trembles if the scope is restricted
to sub-Saharan Africa, where basic conditions for economic
growth seem to be less developed than for e.g. the average
World Bank client. The history of Mozambique makes
these features especially important, but the level at which
the Mozambican economy had settled by the middle of the
1980's still seems to have offered an outstanding potential
for short to middle-term gains from structural adjustment.
General ideas of monetarism in development economics are
reviewed somewhat closer in chapter 3. The main concern
for extreme monetarists is to accommodate a stable econ-
omy by controlling the rate of monetary growth (and noth-
ing else). The underlying idea is that the real economy has
satisfactory self-controlling properties if only macroecon-
omic stability and low inflation is secured. Some detrimen-
tal effects of inflation in developing countries are therefore
discussed separately to illustrate how high inflation may re-
duce the cost-competitiveness, discourage savings and in-
vestments, and cause capital flight. These effects are partly
due to standard macroeconomic theory, and partly to pecu-
liarities of the economies in developing countries.
Next, a simple formal macroeconomic accounting frame-
work is set up to illuminate the different sources of mon-
etary growth in a stylized developing economy. Financial
gaps are identified in the private sector, the public sector,
and by the current account. All these financial gaps can be
directly linked with the money supply via simple national
accounting equations. Thus, changes in the money supply
are determined by the savings surplus in the private sector,
the public budget deficit, and the current account.
Financial sector reforms have developed into an important
and integrated part of most structural adjustment programs.
The sub-Saharan experience with such reforms is also re-
viewed in chapter 2, in trying to draw some conclusions for
future plans for the financial sector. The outcome of finan-
cial sector reform programs so far seems to suggest that too
much has been spent, and too little has been achieved. The
overall experience is that a restructuring the financial sys-
tem has few or no positive effects unless it is accompanied
by close attention the development of the real economy.
For the future, financial reform programs are therefore rec-
ommended to take a somewhat more modest approach, start-
ing from basics, always waiting for backing from the real
side of the economy.
The last part of chapter 2 presents some critical remarks to
the policy recommendations of typical monetarist structural
adjustment programmes. First, it is stressed that financial
liberalization and an according hike in interest rates may
have significant contractive effects via the supply-side of
the economy, because the price of credit plays an important
role for the variable costs of most producers in developing
countries. Second, the exchange rate is equally important
for the domestic price-formation, as imported inputs are of
extreme importance for developing countries in general,
and for manufacturing industries in particular. This implies
that also devaluations and cuts in the inflow of capital may
have suppressive effects on the national income level, at
least in the short run. As both these mechanisms work
mainly through the supply-side of the economy, they leave
room for stagflationary effects of monetarist policies in de-
veloping countries.
* This project has been supported by a grant from the Norwegian Corporation for Development Cooperation (NORAD). I am indebted to Adne Cappelen,
Stale Johnsen, and Olav Ljones for expert comments and suggestions.
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The fourth chapter contains a retrospect on post-inde-
pendence economic policy in Mozambique. The first period
after 1975 was characterized by a centrally planned econ-
omy with extreme lack of human and physical capital re-
sources, both extremely important factors for economic de-
velopment. This situation was worsened by the civil war,
which throttled the economy for almost the entire last de-
cade. The result is an economy where standard macroecon-
omic analysis has almost no interest, at least not before
1987. Economic development seems to have been triggered
by the inflow of capital accommodated by the Economic Re-
covery Plan. However, the medium-term potential for econ-
omic growth seems to have been exhausted by the begin-
ning of the 1990's. The peace treaty of 1992 offers quite
some optimistic prospects, but the costs of war are formi-
dable, and so is the growing debt-burden. This still makes
Mozambique heavily dependent on external funds, also for
the unforeseeable future.
Chapter 4 offers a comparison of social and economic indi-
cators among ten countries in sub-Saharan Africa during the
period 1980-1991.To track the development that has taken
place over the last decade, the sample period is divided into
two sub-periods. Different growth rates and levels are then
presented and compared for the two sub-periods, and for the
different countries. The main impression is that Botswana
stands out as a wealthy nation compared to most other coun-
tries of the region. On the other hand, Mozambique is the
poorest country of the sample, as measured by annual per
capita gross national product (US$ 80). Regarding the econ-
omic performance over the last decade, the general im-
pression is mixed. For Mozambique there seem to have
been a significant turnaround in domestic production imme-
diately after the implementation of the Economic Recovery
Plan, but systematic success of economic policy is not veri-
fied by the descriptive analysis of chapter 4.
Econometric methods are applied in chapter 5 to establish
an empirically-based relationship between the growth in the
gross domestic product and different policy variables as-
sumed to be under some degree of public control. The vari-
ables of our econometric model include broad money sup-
ply, the terms of trade, the exchange rate, net official trans-
fers, and interest rates. The estimation suggests that the rate
of economic growth is invariant to devaluations and change-
s in net official transfers. However, the other variables seem
to influence the rate of economic growth during the 1980's,
both via short-effects, and via long-run structural effects.
To illustrate the workings of the model, it is first simulated
on historical data for Mozambique over the period 1986-
1991, and the results lend support to the idea that macro-
economic analysis hardly was applicable for the Mozambi-
can economy prior to 1987. However, the model offers a
fairly good description of the evolution of GDP under the
Economic Recovery Plan. Second, the model is simulated
for the period 1993-2005 to illustrate the projected effects
of some policy experiments. A slow-down in the rate of
monetary growth produces a reduction in the rate of econ-
omic growth, and is thus contractionary, both in the short
and long run. An improvement in the terms of trade seems
to have undisputed advantageous effects, whereas the effect
of an increase in the interest rates is mixed. An once-and-
for-all increase in the interest rate is contractive in the short
run, but increases the long-run rate of growth via the structu-
ral parameter. This may be interpreted by applying the ideas
of the financial repression literature, where regulated inter-
est rates are claimed to discourage domestic savings,
thereby limiting the funds available for domestic invest-
ments.
Chapter 6 outlines some experimental simulations and pro-
jections for the economy of Mozambique. These experi-
ments illustrate some important points concerning the ef-
fects of macroeconomic policy. First, there is a dilemma in-
volved in the choice of gradual versus "cold turkey"
strategies. Gradualism often dominates the alternative ap-
proach with respect to expected viability of the structural ad-
justment plans, but may be less effective when it comes to
measuring the exact changes in economic indicators over
time. Second, the presentation of chapter 6 underscores the
importance of patience when implemented macroeconomic
stabilization plans for developing countries are to be evalu-
ated. The reason is that the macroeconomic processes seem
to be really sluggish in these countries.
Finally, chapter 7 offers some concluding remarks and calls
for further research on macroeconomic modelling for pol-
icy-planning in developing countries.
1.2 What triggered the structural adjustment
approach?
During the 1970's, important parts of the world economy
saw dramatic cyclical shifts and turns. The oil price shocks
of 1973 and 1979, increasing inflationary pressures in the
developed countries, and a rightward shift in politics in im-
portant western countries, produced a new scepticism to-
wards the ruling approach to macroeconomics. It grew in-
creasingly clear that Keynesian macroeconomics could not
provide a fully satisfactory explanation of the inflationary
pressures that seemed to have been caused mainly by the oil
price shocks. Therefore, a worldwide concern for supply
side macroeconomics emerged. In short, the economic pol-
icy of the industrialized countries reflected a switch of inter-
est from aggregate demand management and employment
considerations towards increasing monetary restraint and in-
flation control.
The developments in the real world did not escape attention
in the more academic fields of macroeconomics and devel-
opment economics. Thus, the popularity of the advocates of
stabilization, deregulation, and liberalization went up. On
the other hand, the former neo-keynesian consensus lost
ground, both in the industrialized world and in the develo-
ping countries. The content of the emerging stabilization
plans for developing countries must be understood on this
background of historical events and real world phenomena.
Together with the second oil price shock, the drop in OECD
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growth rates caused a dramatic negative external shock to
the economies of the third world. The implication was a
deterioration in the terms of trade in most developing coun-
tries, again causing increasing deficits, both internal and ex-
ternal. The developing countries had to react to the external
shocks, and those who responded quickly could somehow
choose their own line of policy. But most developing coun-
tries were not able to respond, and so the misery developed
until the eruption of the debt crisis of 1982.
The result was that the multinational donor society felt
forced to take action on behalf of the countries that had
failed to adjust their economic policy to the shifts in the
macroeconomic climate. Structural adjustment lending and
general conditionality principles were proposed as answers
to the problems. Officially initiated by World Bank Presi-
dent MacNamara in Manila in 1979, programme lending
"has ever since been associated with a particular lending
window of the Bank: An instrument defined as quick-dis-
bursing, exceptional balance of payment financing, based
on economy wide conditionality" (Demery [1993]). Having
corrected for distortions by fictitious shadow-prices for a de-
cade, it was now time to get actual prices right. The econo-
mists behind the resulting adjustment plans were indeed in-
fluenced by the recent shift of paradigm in (esp. US, UK,
and German) macroeconomics. Therefore, the plans that
were designed came to rely quite heavily on supply-side
economics, and so-called monetarism.
The structural adjustment programmes were intended to
cause long-term changes, which in turn could increase the
economic growth potential, and secure a sustainable repay-
ment rate of the national debt. This conflicted with the for-
mer stabilization policies, which were criticized for narrow-
ing the scope to short-run demand management in response
to temporary and reversible shocks. A major difference
from earlier approaches was also the emerging negligence
of special peculiarities of the economy of developing coun-
tries. The new programmes of structural adjustment re-
flected a view that the macroeconomic mechanisms of the
industrialized world are equally valid also in the developing
part of the world.
This was largely how monetarists overcame structuralists
in the approach to macroeconomics in developing countries.
Thus, the worldwide shift of macroeconomic paradigm to-
wards supply side economics came to mean a lot also for
macroeconomic policy design in the third world.
1.3 The never-ending debate
For many developing countries, the entrance of the 1980's
came to mean not just any new decade, but a total shift in
economic conditions and policy. Structural adjustment pro-
grammes were introduced all over the world, but the results
were at best mixed, at least in the short run. Together with
the debt crisis of 1982 and political instability in many de-
veloping countries, the 1980's came to involve a signifi-
cantly renewed economic and political climate for develo-
ping countries.
The structural adjustment programmes focused on three
broad issues: Macroeconomic stability, lifting price con-
trols, and public sector reform. Macroeconomic stability
was to be accomplished by tight money and credit policies
to bring down inflation, deregulation should handle the con-
version to market prices, and privatization was the domi-
nant instrument in the public sector reforms. However, the
designers of the structural adjustment programmes were not
allowed to work undisturbed, and were subject to quite
massive criticism from the start. The former structuralists re-
grouped and formed the neo-structuralist macro critique.
Again, attention was paid to the distinctive features of the
economy in developing countries. But a main difference
was now the attempts to fit the new ideas into a framework
that also left space for supply side mechanisms. An
example is Bruno (1979), who incorporates imperfect com-
petition and unofficial credit markets in a macroeconomic
model with flexible prices. Over the 1980's, the neo-structu-
ralist macro critique produced a number of interesting ideas,
some of which also surfaced in practical applications of de-
velopment economics.
Another source of criticism was the social content of the
structural adjustment programmes. This was brought to the
surface of public debate by UNICEF in 1987, who argued
that the lending programmes of the World Bank only
exacerbated the adverse income distribution and social un-
rest. Slowly, the response to this appraisal surfaced through
the introduction of so-called social action programmes.
After a time, pre- and post-programme income surveys also
came into use, to map the distributional impact of the struc-
tural adjustment programmes. This critique has indeed been
fruitful, and today the programmes of the World Bank are
not only viewing to efficiency matters, but they also show
concern for the income distribution. It has also been ac-
knowledged that a smoother transition to a market economy
may substantially influence the political viability of the
structural adjustment programmes (cf. the recent develop-
ments in Russia).
The World Bank has reviewed the practice of adjustment
lending in a number of documents (e.g. World Bank [1988,
1990, 1992]), and Summers and Pritchett (1993) sum-
marizes some of the findings of these reports. There are
major identification problems emerging when the structural
adjustment programmes are to be evaluated. First, it is
problematic to separate the effects from adjustment from
other aspects influencing the economy. Although a develo-
ping country has undergone structural adjustment, the im-
provement in performance may actually be contributed to
other factors. More generally, a structural adjustment pro-
gramme's ability to predict an upturn does not automat-
ically imply that the upturn was caused by the programme.
Second, a structural adjustment programme normally con-
sists of two parts: A macroeconomic policy component and
a capital inflow component. To distinguish between partial
effects of these two components is quite arduous, not to say
impossible. Third, it is important to clarify to what extent
the countries involved really have submitted to the recom-
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mendations made by the IMF and the World Bank. In Af-
rica, both Zambia and Tanzania have emerged as typical
on/off adjusters, and therefore the economic performance of
these countries can not be attributed solely to the adjust-
ment programmes (or other factors, for that matter).
As Summers and Pritchett (1993) develops into a somewhat
partial treatment of World Bank policy, it does not deserve
too extensive treatment in this connection. Still, their con-
clusions are worth noticing. Their scope is on adjustment
lending, and according to the World Bank reviews adjust-
ment lending generally causes faster growth, higher exports,
reduced deficits, and increased savings. Thus, adjustment
lending is claimed to work. Second, it is argued that the
positive effects of adjustment are of medium to long-term
character, requiring patience in evaluation of the reforms.
Third, and interesting for sub-Saharan Africa, it is pointed
out that adjustment lending generally seems to have worked
more effectively in middle-income countries than in low-in-
come countries. Summers and Pritchett (1993) actually state
that "adjustment has helped, but has not solved the long-run
growth problems of most low-income countries, especially
in sub-Saharan Africa " (italics added). The general criti-
cism against structural adjustment thus seems to bear a
higher degree of relevance for sub-Saharan Africa than for
the average World Bank client.
This impression is substantiated by a closer look at one of
the latest policy research reports from the World Bank
(1993). In this report the progress, payoffs, and challenges
of adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa is subjected to an em-
pirical analysis. The conclusions confirm the seemingly
general view taken by the multinational donor society: sub-
Saharan Africa is to be considered as a sick child. Accord-
ingly, it is concluded that the areas of general macroecon-
omics and incentives need more of the same medicine,
while the public and financial sectors desperately want a
change in medicine. Thus, the fundamental view of how to
address the macroeconomic problems of sub-Saharan Af-
rica remains largely unchanged.
More interesting perhaps, are the comments to the World
Bank (1993) offered by economists at the Research Depart-
ment of Statistics Norway (Cappelen et al. [1993]). They
conclude that the methods of the World Bank do not suffice
for a good explanation of the links between inflow of aid,
policy reforms, and macroeconomic performance Further,
it is argued that policy reforms may have caused significant
positive changes even in the absence of capital inflow,
again highlighting the identification problem involved in
evaluating adjustment lending. Finally, and probably more
seriously, it is suggested that some of the World Bank's con-
clusions seem to be biased in favour of structural adjust-
ment lending. Although one may get the opposite im-
pression by reading World Bank documents, there is still no
consensus over the design and impact of structural adjust-
ment.
When trying to explain why the response of sub-Saharan Af-
rica to structural adjustment is minimal compared to the
other adjusters, the World Bank (1993a) draws attention to
features that are characteristic for sub-Saharan countries.
Among these are institutional weakness, severe government
failures, and lack of human capital. If one were to range the
countries of sub-Saharan Africa according to these indica-
tors, Mozambique would probably be struggling near the
bottom of the list. In conclusion, the structural adjustment
programmes seem to have had a slightly positive effect on
average World Bank clients. This implies that empirical ana-
lyses on the matter may draw some supportive conclusions
if all adjusters are included in the data set. However, these
conclusions are easily modified if the scope is restricted to
sub-Saharan African adjusters, where the point of departure
is worse than in the rest of the third world. To what degree
the argument is further extendable to the situation in Mo-
zambique remains to be seen, and hopefully, the next chap-
ter will shed some light on this question.
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2. Monetarism in developing countries
2.1 The fundamental ideas
In short, monetarism is the view held by several neoclassi-
cal economists that the quantity of money has a predomi-
nant influence on the price level, and that the objectives of
macroeconomic policy are best achieved simply by target-
ing the rate of growth of the money supply.
The following exposition is devoted to illustrating the cen-
tral ideas of the monetarist approach to macroeconomic pol-
icy, and to stabilization and structural adjustment in develo-
ping countries. The outline is general, in the sense that it
aims at providing a description of the ruling principles be-
hind the construction of structural adjustment programmes
for representative clients of the multinational donor society.
However, without considerable loss of generality, some
technical modifications are made to accomplish the special
features of under-developed countries like Mozambique.
These modifications particularly concern the repressed capi-
tal and financial markets, features that have implications for
the transmission of monetary impulses. But before we con-
centrate on factors that influence on the money stock, the
basic ideas of monetarism require a general introduction.
The fundamentals of monetarism may be illustrated by the
identity:
(1) PYMV
whereby the price level (P) multiplied by the gross national
product (Y) must equal the money supply (M) times the vel-
ocity ratio (V). Although describing an accounting identity,
equation (1) does not offer a proper behavioral explanation
of the relationship between the four variables.
The identity of equation (1) may be transformed to relate
the respective rates of change, which must imply:
(2) P+j, r--in+i)
Equation (2) states that the rate of inflation Q.)) plus the rate
of GDP growth (y) must equal the monetary growth rate (tit)
corrected for changes over time in the velocity of money
(i, ). Monetarists now claim that the physical volume of out-
put is determined largely by some underlying long-run
equilibrium in the markets for commodities and labour, and
that GDP growth is unaffected by monetary factors. Fur-
ther, it is claimed that changes over time in the velocity of
money are negligible compared to changes in the money
stock, implying for equation (2) that v = 0 . Incorporating
these modifications, equation (2) reduces to:
(3) 13=1h-4
Thus, for a given level of national income, the rate of infla-
tion is given by the growth in the money supply. This
claimed long-run relationship between money and prices
substantiates the view that inflation results primarily from
over-expansion of the money stock, and that inflation can
be checked by proper adjustment of the monetary policy in-
struments. Further, equation (3) illustrates how a constant
growth rate of the money stock also will secure a constant
rate of inflation. This describes the core of Milton Fried-
man's celebrated declaration that inflation is always and
everywhere a monetary phenomenon.
Every structural adjustment programme contains an element
of macroeconomic stabilization. As we have seen, this ap-
proach to macroeconomics is dominated by so-called mone-
tarists, who target the expansion of money and credit to cre-
ate a stable and low-inflation macroeconomy. The reduction
of inflation is thus crucial to the claimed intentions of the
structural adjustment programmes. There are several reason-
s why inflation is a threat to developing economies. These
include both traditional effects, and mechanisms that are
more specific to the third world.
First, with sticky wages and fixed exchange rates, the cost
competitiveness is reduced as a direct result of a higher rate
of inflation than the rest of the world. This loss of competi-
tiveness may be counteracted by a continuous devaluation
of the currency to keep the real exchange rate constant.
This is exactly what is observed in Mozambique and the
other adjusting countries south of Sahara
Second, the inflation rate influences the real interest rates,
especially if nominal interest rates are subject to regula-
tions. Regulation and segmentation are common features of
financial markets in developing countries, and Mozambique
is no exception. Low real interest rates will in turn cause
11
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low domestic savings and capital flight. Thus, bringing
down inflation may increase real interest rates and improve
the efficiency of the financial markets. However, the ob-
served pattern of capital flight can not be explained entirely
by interest rate differentials, a fact that was accentuated for
Mozambique in the middle 1970's. This illuminates the
third detrimental effect of a high inflation rate: a special re-
lationship between inflation and capital flight is claimed for
developing countries. The explanation is that domestic and
foreign assets may have different risk components. With a
constant real exchange rate, foreign assets represent fairly
safe investments. On the other hand, as the real value of do-
mestic assets depend on the inflation rate, a volatile rate of
inflation will make domestic assets a risky investment. If
the level of inflation also indicates the volatility of inflation,
a higher level of inflation will cause a shift away from do-
mestic assets, resulting in capital flight.
Third, the above link between inflation and capital flight im-
plies that an increase in the rate of inflation will reduce the
availability of domestic funds for investment. Thus, there
seem to be a special indirect link between inflation and in-
vestment in representative developing countries.
These different adverse effects of a high and rising inflation
rate provide an explanation for the multinational donor so-
ciety's concern with the rate of inflation. The next section il-
lustrates the monetarist policy measures in a simple macro-
economic framework.
2.2 A monetarist macroeconomic framework
The following exposition aims at providing a simple techni-
cal framework for analyzing some of the monetary mechan-
isms in developing countries. This will serve as a point of
departure for closer looks at the different factors that in-
fluence the growth of the stock of money. This kind of
model framework is very useful to understand the ideas
underlying the structural adjustment approach to develop-
ment economics. In our model the private banking system is
merged with the central bank, and the aggregated "money
supplier" is referred to as the banking system. For Mozam-
bique this is not an especially far-fetched assumption, as
state-owned banks control over 95% of total assets
(IMF[ 1992b1). With this simplifying assumption, our model
framework contains five different holders of liabilities.
These are: the government, private households, private
firms, the banking system, and a foreign sector. However,
the underdevelopment of the capital markets implies quite a
lot of restrictions on different agents' access to capital
assets, and this will be highlighted by the explicit and im-
plicit assumptions made in the exposition below. The cardi-
nal point of reference is the national income identity:
(4) C+S+TEC+1+G±(A—B)+F
where C is private consumption, S is domestic saving, tax
revenues are given by T, I represents investments, and G is
public expenditures. Exports are given by A, imports by B,
and F represents net transfers from abroad. Transformed
into a national flow-of-funds identity, equation (4) must
also imply:
(5) (S-1)+(T—G)EA—B+F
expressing that any domestic imbalances must be offset
through the external accounts. The first term on the left side
of equation (5) may be interpreted as net private saving, the
second term is the surplus of the public sector, whereas the
right side represents the current account surplus in the bal-
ance of payments. Allowing for international flow of public
capital only, balance in the current account implies:
(6) A—B+F=e(AR* + A B*)
where e is the exchange rate, R * is the change in foreign
reserves in the banking system, and B
*
 represents changes
in government borrowing abroad, materializing in terms of
foreign sale of government bonds. The assumption that pri-
vate firms and households are excluded from holding
foreign assets captures the effects of a highly regulated
foreign exchange market. However, this is not critical for
the central results.
As we can see from equation (6), foreign borrowing is thus
one of the sources of finance for the government's budget
deficit. Another possibility is domestic sale of bonds (B),
and these are assumed to be bought exclusively by the bank-
ing system, excluding both private firms and private house-
holds from the government bond market. This yields for the
financing of the budget deficit:
(7) G — T = e AB* + AB
With restrictions on private international capital flows, a
saving surplus in the private sector must imply accumula-
tion of the money stock (M) or a reduction in bank loans to
the private sector (L):
(8) S — I = AM-AL
Inserting equations (6), (7), and (8) into equation (5) now
gives for the change in the money stock:
(9) AM = eAR* + AB + AL
Equation (9) establishes a direct link between national in-
come identity of equation (4) and the evolution of the mon-
etary base, and may be used to highlight the monetary trans-
mission mechanisms stressed by the monetarist approach to
macroeconomics. The first term on the right-hand side of
equation (9) represents the effect on the money stock origin-
ating in a change in the foreign reserves in the banking sys-
tem. The second term shows the impact on the money sup-
ply from an increase in the banking system's claims on the
public sector, and thereby links the budget deficit to the
money supply. The third effect incorporates the impact on
the money supply from a change in credit to the private sec-
tor. This macroeconomic framework illustrates the main
12
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ideas behind the financial gap analyses offered by the multi-
national donor agencies. Financial gaps in the private, pub-
lic, and external sectors of the economy cause changes in
the money stock, and these monetary impulses feed directly
onto the inflationary process. That may explain some of the
multinational donors' concern for financial gaps.
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (9) links
the money supply mechanism to the current account. This
term is in accordance with the monetarist approach to the
balance of payments, the extension of the traditional mone-
tarist approach to international macroeconomics. The mon-
etary approach to the balance of payments distinguishes it-
self from other approaches by focusing directly on the ef-
fects from the money market on the balance of payments,
rather than working through the implied changes in the
goods and asset markets. This school of thought is also an
advocate of floating exchange rate regimes. The rationale
for this conclusion is that a floating exchange rate is con-
sidered to adjust in order to equilibrate the international
trade flows. For equation (9) this implies that e will settle at
a value to satisfy:
(10) eAR* = 0
If this is were complete story, any country would be able to
control its domestic money stock independently of interna-
tional commodity and capital flows by letting its currency
float. Thus, the domestic stock of money may still be
targeted by policy measures, and this is exactly what links
the monetary balance of payments approach to traditional
monetarism.
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (9) illus-
trates the link between the public budget deficits and the
process of money creation. This highlights a common
source of critique against the governments of developing
countries, who are accused of financing their budget deficits
by an inflation tax, or so-called seigniorage. The reason is
that when the government issues new money, it really takes
interest-free loan in the private sector. In turn, the private
sector will have to bear the costs in terms of higher infla-
tion. Similar results may be reached by an examination of
the required reserve ratio. The banking system is required to
hold a certain amount of reserves, and these are determined
by the required reserve ratio as a constant share of total de-
posits. The money multiplier is negatively influenced by
this required reserve ratio, which implies that "freezing"
money in the banking system suppresses the efficiency of
monetary policy. This conclusion rests crucially on the as-
sumption that required reserves in the banking system also
correspond to actual reserves held. However, in developing
countries it has been quite common to use the reserve re-
quirement ratio as a policy instrument, to finance the public
budget deficits (cf. Fry [1988]). This implicitly means that
the anti-inflationary effects of keeping reserves are under-
mined, and therefore it is claimed that for practical purposes
the required reserve ratio may be considered an instrument
of inflation tax in developing countries. This seemingly per-
verted content of the reserve requirement ratio is better
understood if we keep in mind the extremely tight connec-
tion between the central bank and the government in develo-
ping countries, especially in some sub-Saharan countries.
The last term on the right-hand side of equation (9) de-
scribes the change in credit to the private sector. Thus, con-
trolling the stock of money also implies monitoring the flow
of credit to the private sector. Accordingly, the supply of
credit is usually choked by restrictions like credit ceilings
and directed credit facilities. In Mozambique, credit is nor-
mally out of the question for ordinary consumers, and
largely also for small-scale producers. The credit control
therefore seems to contain some adverse effects on the dis-
tribution of income. The implications for future policy de-
sign are commented in the next section.
2.3 The rationale for financial sector reforms
Financial aspects of economic development have played a
significant role in the theoretical literature of development
economics for decades (see e.g. Gurley and Shaw [1955,
1960], McKinnon [1973] and Shaw [1973]). However, dur-
ing the 1980's these ideas seem to have established them-
selves to an increasing extent also in the multilateral donor
society's design of structural adjustment programs in Af-
rica, and a financial sector reform has recently also been im-
plemented in Mozambique (IMF[1992b1). The public sec-
tor's reliance on the banking system has, coupled with high
and unstable inflation rates, caused negative real interest
rates in many African countries. Low real interest rates dis-
courage savings, whereas the variability of real interest
rates presents a threat to private investment. Lifting the in-
terest rate regulations has therefore been an important part
of financial sector reforms in these countries, but so far the
positive results have been lacking almost totally. One expla-
nation is that the competition of the banking system in Afri-
can countries is limited because of the small number of sup-
pliers of banking services. This leaves little room for compe-
tition and market-determined interest rates, in turn restrict-
ing the room for deregulation.
Table 2.1 Some indicators of financial deepening 1990
Country Bank deposits to Public sector Total loans
money supply (M2) loans to GDP to GDP
Botswana 0.53 0.01 0.10
Kenya 0.40 0.06 0.24
Malawi 0.74 0.03 0.10
Mozambique 0.74 0.23 0.36
Tanzania 0.64 0.25 0.28
Zambia 0.82 0.11 0.31
Zimbabwe 0.69 0.12 0.31
Japan 0.92 0.17 1.35
Norway 0.83 0.11 0.79
West-Germany 0.89 0.26 1.12
Source: IMF (1990), World Bank (1992b).
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In Mozambique, the failure to bring down inflation has kept
most real interest rates negative, despite nominal interest
rates of over 40% on bank loans. The experience has shown
that interest rate reforms are unlikely to succeed, unless the
overall macroeconomic environment is stable and sound.
For Mozambique this seems to suggest that a well-function-
ing financial sector is critically dependent on a reduced and
stabilized inflation rate and an independent central bank, to
secure a sustainable long-term credit and monetary policy.
Another characteristic of many African countries, including
Mozambique, has been the variety of preferential credits,
available for a number of sectors and activities. Political in-
fluence has made the directed credit programs favour public
projects, thereby crowding out private sector investments.
As the interest rates of the directed credits have adjusted
only with a lag (or not at all), the programs may also be
looked upon as a way of disguising subsidies. An ingredient
of most of the financial sector reform programs has there-
fore been to cut down on these directed credit facilities, the
central idea being that project selection should be market-
based, not administered.
As the financial reform programs started, many African
banks were badly managed, and even insolvent, both ele-
ments stressed in the financial sector study of Mozambique
(IMF[1992b]). An important task has therefore been to re-
capitalize the banking system in a broad sense. For the coun-
tries involved, this has in part proved overwhelmingly ex-
pensive, depending on the terms achieved by the banks re-
garding their bad loans. Neither has privatization of public
banks proved especially successful. The overall experience
seem to be that consolidation and recapitalization of the
banking system has few or no positive effects unless it is ac-
companied by close attention to the general policy frame-
work.
Another problem of almost all sub-Saharan countries con-
cerns the level of skills of bank managers and their em-
ployees. There is room for improvement on all levels in this
area, but in fields like simple accounting and auditing the
problems seem to be especially serious. This is well-known
also in Mozambique, as a considerable part of the blue-col-
lar bank staff lack the most elementary skills of mathe-
matics, and many managers know less than a minimum
about accounting and auditing. The designers of the finan-
cial reform programs are to blame, as attempts to improve
the financial expertise over the 1980's have been almost ab-
sent. Where the training aspect has been an integrated part
of the reform, the results are at this stage weak. However,
one should bear in mind that educational policies of this
type have a typical long-term profile, suggesting that it still
may be too early to judge their full impact. A related aspect
is the adaptation of an appropriate legal environment, con-
sidered by experts as an important part of the financial sec-
tor reforms. Nonetheless, reforms of the legal system do not
seem to have received the resources they deserve in desig-
ning and carrying through the structural adjustment pro-
grams.
In connection with the financial sector reforms, some effort
has also been put into the development of domestic money
markets. Where the fiscal and budgetary situation is some-
what stable, this seems to have been wise. One reason is
that the establishment of a money market enables the cen-
tral bank to perform market operations in order to manipu-
late the money supply. In addition, interbank markets let the
banks provide each other with liquidity, instead of being
forced to turn to the central bank for every temporary need
of funds. More resources can then be devoted by the central
bank to controlling the overall liquidity level. Domestic
money markets also increase the availability of financial in-
struments, and this is likely to raise domestic savings.
Although the time span is short, it may well be claimed that
the financial sector reforms of the 80's to a large extent
have failed. The policy designers reached ambitiously at a
problem that seemed important, overlooking the complexity
and the interlinkages to the rest of the economy. The chal-
lenge of the future will therefore be to start from scratch
and go somewhat more carefully ahead. Efficient payments
and credit allocation, safe and sound banking, and financial
discipline must be enforced well before resources are of-
fered to the more idealistic ideas of money markets and ex-
tended financial deepening.
The experience with banking reforms suggests that recapita-
lizing and restructuring should not be addressed without at-
tending also the real side problems of the financial system,
so that the return of financial distress can be minimized. Fu-
ture plans for restructuring of the banking system should fur-
ther emphasize the importance of down-sizing and manage-
ment and performance criteria. This will help in identifying
and removing lemons from the banking system, securing an
improved environment for suitable investors.
To improve the quality of services, one should also apply a
strategy that will increase the competition of the banking
system. However, this does not mean that an overall lib-
eralization of entry should be introduced. As a result of the
financial sector reforms, some countries are already over-
banked. The country-specific design must therefore depend
on the existing aggregate financial structure, taking into con-
sideration the fact that liberal bank entry may in turn cause
financial distress. The strategy of removing the directed
credit facilities should be prolonged to secure profitable
bank operation and improved monetary control. Direct
credit channels are vulnerable to loan defaults and political
captivity, reducing their efficiency in the allocation of
credit. The development of market-based credit allocation
should therefore be followed also in the future.
Agriculture and small-scale industry have proved to be im-
portant engines of growth in Mozambique during the late
1980's. The existing banking system is generally not at all
designed to take care of the needs of these sectors. Conse-
quently, the informal markets are left to provide credit to ag-
riculture and small-scale industry. Dealing with small-scale
customers is expensive for the formal bank sector, and these
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activities are therefore left to the informal markets in the
short term. Instead of trying to regulate the informal mar-
kets, in the longer run the governments should provide the
formal banking system with conditions that make it possible
to compete with traditional informal credit suppliers, also
when it comes to small-scale industry and agriculture. This
will imply a more efficient intermediary role of the formal
banking system and at the same time improving the domes-
tic payment systems. Still, to the extent that the existence of
informal markets have adverse effects on the economy as
such, action should be taken to link the formal and the infor-
mal credit markets. Then the policy instruments of the mon-
etary authorities can be directed towards the informal sector
through the formal banking system.
The financial reform programs have failed for a number of
reasons, the most important being that the overall economic
environment has not adjusted to support the financial devel-
opment. This has caused a rapid return of general problems
like mismanagement, lack of financial discipline, financial
distress, and inefficient payment systems and credit alloca-
tion. However, in refreshing the development strategies for
Mozambique, one should not jump to the conclusion that
financial reforms should be abandoned, but make sure that
they are appropriately phased. When planning for the fu-
ture, financial reform programs are recommended to take a
somewhat more modest approach, starting from basics, al-
ways waiting for backing from the real side of the economy.
2.4 Why monetarism might not work
The crux of any criticism against monetarism and structural
adjustment is captured by looking closer into different econ-
omists' evaluation of short-term and long-term consider-
ations. The monetarist approach is clearly concerned mainly
with long-term macroeconomic stability in well-functioning
market economies, stressing the stability over time of beha-
vioral economic relations (e.g money demand). The implica-
tion is that also the macroeconomic framework is one of
continuous equilibrium. Policy recommendations are charac-
terized by a general laissez-faire attitude towards the role of
the state. One of the few policy measures that should be ap-
plied, according to traditional monetarists, concerns the
growth of the money supply, and this should be measured to
accommodate a situation of long-run stability with a low
and constant rate of inflation. Thus, short-run instability and
macroeconomic disequilibrium are features that are re-
garded as less relevant to any description of the economy.
On the other hand, the neo-Keynesian is more of a disequili-
brium approach, focusing less on typical long-run problems.
Among the factors that are stressed are market-imperfec-
tios, capacity utilization, and unemployment. The policy im-
plications rest on an explicit care for short-run phenomena,
and accordingly, neo-Keynesians recommend manipulation
of aggregate demand, to prevent production and employ-
ment from fluctuating too dramatically in the short run.
According to the above distinction, it may be claimed that
the two approaches are not developed to handle the same
macroeconomic problems, and therefore, that they should
not be subject to direct comparisons. Further, it is tempting
to draw the conclusion that monetarism and structural ad-
justment do not give proper answers because they do not
formulate the appropriate questions. This conclusion rests
on the assumption that the short-term problems are more im-
portant for developing countries than their long-run prob-
lems, and now we really approach the core of the ongoing
debate. The challenge is therefore to compose an economic
and political strategy that represents an optimal mix of
short-run and long-run instruments.
This problem may well be illustrated by the case of agricul-
tural production in Mozambique. Devaluations, decreasing
inflation and transition to market-based food production are
measures supposed to increase exports and purchasing
power of the rural poor over the medium term. In the mean-
time they are suffering because of rapidly rising domestic
prices, credit squeeze, and the riskiness of selling to a mar-
ket. Together with a seriously underdeveloped infrastruc-
ture this might provide an explanation of the lack of supply
response in agricultural production.
In addition to the basic conflicting views regarding short-
run and long-run perspectives, there are significant diver-
gences regarding the impact of the different policy
measures. As noted above, monetarists tend to stress that de-
veloping economies are to be treated as any other economy,
and that there are stable behavioral foundations with global
validity. This view is opposed by the new structuralist
macro critique. This school of thought underscores the spe-
cial features of the economy in developing countries, leav-
ing room for quite extraordinary results regarding the tradi-
tional instruments of economic policy.
As we saw in the previous section, a distinct feature of
every financial sector reform programme for developing
countries is the lifting of interest rate ceilings to liberate the
financial markets. These efforts to make the financial mar-
kets more efficient may have real effects that are unique for
developing countries, and these effects are largely neglected
in the multinational donors' structural adjustment pro-
grammes. Below, we will look more closely into some of
the reasons why interest rate liberalization may have con-
tractionary and inflationary effects.
First, there are special features of the supply side of develo-
ping economies that may cause perversion of standard re-
sults concerning tight monetary policies and increased inter-
est rates. Credit financing of working capital needs is cru-
cial supporting a production process with extreme lack of
liquidity in developing countries, especially in manufactur-
ing industries. Tight monetary policies and increased real in-
terest rates will increase the firms' costs of short term
credit. This will push the marginal costs upwards, and for
given prices, production will decrease. On impact one may
experience that tight monetary policies may cause inflation-
ary pressures via the supply side of the economy. These are
perverted effects of monetary policies in developing coun-
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tries that are stressed in a number of neo-structuralist works
(e.g. Bruno [1979], Taylor [1981]).
Second, to the extent that consumers are active in the credit
markets, one may experience contractionary effects of tight
monetary policies also via the demand side of the economy.
The reason is that a contraction of the monetary base will in-
crease the costs of finance also for households, squeezing
out consumption expenditures and aggregate demand. In ad-
dition, households must be assumed to place all their saving-
s, whatever these might amount to, in unofficial credit mar-
kets, where the rate of return exceeds the deposit rate of-
fered by the banking system. One of these is typically the
black market for foreign exchange. An increased official in-
terest rate is then likely to cause a reduced black-market pre-
mium, and those who have placed their savings in foreign
exchange are therefore likely to suffer from a negative shift
in real wealth. On an aggregate level this third-world spe-
cific effect may reinforce the contractionary effects of tight
monetary policies via the demand side of the economy (see
Montiel [1991]).
Third, a narrow connection between the commercial bank-
ing system, the central bank, and the government opens for
quite peculiar macroeconomic effects concerning interest
rates, financial liberalization and inflation. An important
source of government finance is credit extended by the cen-
tral bank, especially in socialist countries. With Tanzania as
a point of reference, Collier and Gunning (1991) illustrate
how the process of money creation is influenced by the inti-
macy between the government and the banking system in a
socialist developing country. Their analysis may have relev-
ance also for Mozambique. Collier and Gunning (1991)
have the banking system's credit to the government as a
point of reference. The banking system's assets are totally
dominated by credit to the government, or to public enter-
prises. Financial sector reforms and interest rate liberaliza-
tion in such an environment result in an escalation of inter-
est payments from the government, again making the bud-
get deficit increase. As far as money creation is influenced
by the budget deficits, the rate of inflation may thus also be
threatened by financial sector reforms.
Fourth, devaluations have a special effect in developing
countries, reflecting the producers' critical dependence on
imported inputs. We touched upon the same idea in chapter
2, when commenting on the recent history of economic pol-
icy in Mozambique. It is widely acknowledged that im-
ported inputs play an important role in the production pro-
cess of most developing countries. Table 3.1 reveals that
Mozambique is no exception in this respect. Since the im-
plementation of ERP, the access to foreign currency and im-
ports have increased, and this development is in general
tracked surprisingly precisely by the growth in GDP. How-
ever, the continuous devaluations of the currency have grad-
ually squeezed the access to foreign funds, and the effect
has been to throttle the import of inputs, again causing GDP
growth to stagnate. In the long run Mozambique will have
to improve the international competitiveness to be able to
pay for her imports. Nonetheless, the urban and rural poor
suffer increasingly because of the emphasis on long-run pol-
icy. More generally, if the real wage rate is already at sub-
sistence minimum, devaluations may cause hunger, unless
the income reduction is accompanied by continuous inflow
of funds. This illuminates the dilemma of choosing the right
mix of short and long-run economic and political strategies.
That contractions of the money supply may have significant
real effects is close to an established fact in standard macro-
economic analysis. Many industrialized countries take the
consequence as they measure short-run strategies to counter-
act cyclical changes in employment and aggregate demand.
However, in mapping out the strategies for developing coun-
tries, short run considerations seem somewhat neglected.
Comparing the urgency of the social and economic prob-
lems in industrialized and developing countries, this can be
considered as a striking observation. This view also finds
support in the evaluation of the Norwegian development
strategy concerning Mozambique made by Brochmann and
Ofstad (1990). As argued earlier, Mozambique will be a
country in severe economic and social crisis in many years
to come. Accordingly, economic and political measures
should be adopted to secure a development strategy with a
human face, whereas the adjustment to a long-run sustain-
able situation should be undertaken with extreme care.
These considerations are highly important, and should be
followed even if they imply deviations from the plans made
by the multinational donor society.
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3. Structural adjustment in
Mozambique
3.1 Post-independence economic policy
The macroeconomic setting of the early post-independence
period was characterized by FRELIMO's attempts to intro-
duce a centrally planned economic environment. As the dra-
matic exodus of 1974 had drained the country of both
human and physical capital, the prospects of fast recovery
were poor. During the last half of the 1970's, enterprises
left by the Portuguese were taken over by the state, initially
of practical as well as political reasons. As the confidence
in leadership and ideology increased, the approach to econ-
omic policy was heavily influenced by FRELIMO's endeav-
our to introduce a socialist system of rapid development and
equality. One may suspect the transition of the late 1970's
to have been as spectacular as today's structural adjustment
plans, and according to Bowen (1992), the post-inde-
pendence economic and political strategy was completely in
disharmony with the existing socio-economic conditions.
FRELIMO gradually acknowledged that the economy was
in need of some sort of restructuring, and in 1980 the first
ten-year plan of economic policy was set out. A rigid sys-
tem of central planning was introduced, and to accomplish
"victory over underdevelopment" the gross national product
was meant to rise by 17% a year. Emphasis was placed on
giant development projects like state farms, heavy industry,
and energy production. Other dominant features of the ten-
year plan were the organization of the peasantry into com-
munal villages, and the collectivization of agriculture to in-
crease production. By the fourth FRELIMO congress of
1983 it had become clear that the ten-year plan was a
failure. The huge public projects were growing out of con-
trol, and were losing enormous amounts of money. The
managerial capacity was lacking, both for the state farms
and for industrial projects.
The ten-year plan was revised, and emphasis was now put
on existing capacity. All new projects were of the small-
scale type, and a division of the state farms into more practi-
cal units was initiated. At the same time, the government re-
sponded to the decline in production by credit expansion.
However, these measures were not sufficient to stop the de-
cline in all sectors of production. The expansionary mon-
etary policy opened perilous financial gaps over the period
1981-1986: domestic credit increased by 150% while the
country's net financial assets practically dried out. In addi-
tion came the South African destabilization campaigns and
the civil war, both aspects that seriously throttled the flow
of most goods and services. Finally, as a result of extensive
domestic price-distortions, the private producers lacked the
necessary incentives for production to rise.
3.2 The Economic Recovery Program
To halt the economic contraction, and to gain access to
multilateral donor funds, Mozambique joined the IMF and
the World Bank in 1984. Thus, structural adjustment lend-
ing came to reach Mozambique, and by 1987 the inflow of
aid and credit was conditioned on the implementation of an
economic recovery program (ERP) designed by the Bretton-
Woods institutions. The ambition of the ERP was threefold.
First, the level of production should rise, to establish a mini-
mum level of per capita consumption and income, with spe-
cial emphasis on the rural poor. Second, the public and ex-
ternal deficits were to be closed. Third, the macroeconomic
conditions should be prepared to support a faster pace of
medium and long-term economic growth. From now on Mo-
zambique followed a standard structural adjustment plan, in-
corporating characteristic features such as augmentation of
market forces, improvement of private capital access, down-
scaling of the public sector, contraction of domestic credit,
and dramatic devaluations. After the implementation of the
economic recovery plan, IMF (1992, 19931) and the World
Bank (1992b) summarize the development in macroecon-
omic indicators as shown in table 3.1.
The ERP seems to have caused a certain immediate upturn
in production and domestic absorption, but this growth le-
velled out already by the beginning of the 1990's. A variety
of explanations have been put forward to explain this stag-
nation. These may be sorted into groups: external shocks,
the costs of peace, and failure of economic policy. External
shocks include factors such as political changes in Europe,
changes in the inflow and composition of aid, the oil crisis
of 1990, an erratic domestic insecurity situation, and va-
rying climatic conditions. Export markets and sources of ex-
ternal finance collapsed after the breakdown of the former
political regimes in Eastern-Europe.
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1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1
Real growth rates
GDP 2.3 4.6 5.5 5.4 1.3 2.6 - 2.3 5.6
GDP per capita -0.8 2.0 2.8 2.7 - 1.3 0.1 -3.9
Gross investment 51.4 15.6 16.5 7.3 8.5 2.5 -4.2 21.0
Ratios to GDP
Debt service .. 39.8 37.3 35.3. 40.3 48.3 67.9
Gross investment 9.7 23.8 33.4 35.5 38.1 40.8 43.5 50.2
Domestic saving -	 1.1 -10.5 - 16.4 - 16.6 - 11.7 -9.7 - 15.1 -22.6
Budget deficit
Before grants .. .. 25.3 25.5 29.3 26.0 29.8 30.8
After grants 9.5 20.3 11.3 8.91 2.4 5.8 6.2 - 3.4
Exports 3.6 11.9 15.1 15.4 15.9 22.6 26.7 29.7
Imports 14.4 46.1 65.0 67.5 65.7 73.0 85.3 102.4
Current account
Before grants -15.1 - 45.7 - 52.9 - 58.8 - 54.7 - 53.9 - 65.0 - 103.0
After grants - 22.6 -28.9 - 12.6 - 17.3 -21.0 -41.7
Real exch. rate (1987 = 100) 438.5 100 63.3 63.4 63.1 52.6 42.1 41.0
Annual rate of inflation 32.5 163 50.1 42.1 49.2 33.2 45.1 39.6
' Estimates.
I) Given the current estimate of population growth at 2.6% per annum.
Source: IMF (1992, 1993a), World Bank (1992b).
Mozambique used to have a good relationship with the for-
mer eastern block in Europe, especially with the former
GDR, and this offered Mozambicans opportunities in the
form of export markets, guest working, and access to capital
and certain technological expertise. It is a widely held view
that these factors are important in explaining the stagnation
in economic performance around 1990. At the turn of the
decade, some 14,000 guest workers returned from East Ger-
many, as a direct result of the reconciliation between the
two German states. This caused the elimination of an im-
portant source of labour training and foreign exchange. Indi-
rectly, and perhaps as important, this repatriation also seems
to have increased the already existing unrest in the Mozam-
bican labour force, as the degree of labour militancy has
shown a marked increase over the last few years.
When trying to explain the setback of the early 1990's, the
World Bank (1993b) emphasizes the role of the level and
composition of the inflow of aid. From 1990 we have seen a
significant reduction in import support and programme aid,
whereas food and emergency aid has risen moderately,
mostly due to the drought of 1992. This implies a change in
the distribution of aid away from typical growth-promoting
funds towards short-term emergency aid. The World Bank
also emphasizes the fact that the total inflow of aid has de-
clined since 1990, especially as a result of the political
events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Combined
with the oil crisis of 1990, these external shocks may ex-
plain a part of the stagnation that occurred in 1990.
Climatic conditions vary considerably from year to year, an
element that has a particularly influential bearing on agricul-
tural production. With the exception of 1992, the climatic
conditions were not particularly worse in the early 1990's
than over the 1980's. In spite of this, the annual growth rate
of agricultural production fell from 4 per cent in 1989 to 1.1
and 1.9 per cent in 1990 and 1991, respectively (cf. table
3.1). Going further back than 1989, the stagnation in agricul-
tural production becomes even more aggravating, as agricul-
tural production increased by more than 7 per cent a year,
both in 1987 and 1988. Thus, the implementation of the
ERP had at best some temporary effects on the agricultural
production, leaving long-term issues largely unsolved.
By the costs of peace, we refer to the parts of the peace pro-
cess that may have negative influences on the potential for
economic development and growth, especially in the short
term. The multinational donors are also increasingly con-
cerned with what they refer to as the increased public expen-
ditures in connection with the demobilization. The new
army is planned to total 30,000 soldiers. This implies the
demobilization of some 100,000 troops. At an expense of
US$ 700 per soldier this will cost the Mozambican govern-
ment around US$ 70 million. In addition, there are consider-
able cost elements connected to the process of resettlement.
The repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries
causes the population to increase, again pressing per capita
growth rates downward. In addition, a great many of the for-
mer refugees are unemployed, homeless, and extremely
poor. In the short run, they will therefore increase public ex-
penditures for social services and immediate economic as-
sistance. All these relatively acute aspects of the peace pro-
cess have undoubtedly increased the expenditure side of the
public budgets in the short term, whereas the observable
economic benefits of peace are typically longer-term ef-
fects. As the peace was not settled until late 1992, the se-
curity situation was still unstable both in 1990 and 1991. A
result was that industrial production was harmed by the de-
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Table 3.2 The evolution of;production by 	 sector 1986-1992
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1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992*)
Agriculture - 0.6 7.0 72 4.0 1.1 1.9 - 8.0
Industry - 18.6 - 4.3 8.9 6.8 - 8.3 - 0.5 0.0
Construction - 4.4 44.8 16.0 3.0 1.5 3.0 2.0
Transport - 11.8 1.7 - 9.8 10.2 19.8 13.2 4.0
Commerce - 6.8 - 0.7 3.5 4.0 2.5 2.0 2.0
GDP 2.3 4.6 5.5 5.4 1.3 2.6 - 2.3
*) Estimates.
Annual growth rates in per cent. Source: IMF (1992), the World Bank
(1992b).
struction of electricity supply in 1990. Thus, the stagnation
of economic development and growth may also have been
caused by factors directly related to the insecurity of the
civil war, and to the establishment of peace.
There are also economists who will have it that parts of the
ERP itself may have caused the stagnation of the early
1990's. Critics of the structural adjustment plans for develo-
ping countries often point to industries' critical dependence
upon imported inputs. If foreign currency is a scarce re-
source under these conditions, a bottleneck in the supply-
side of the economy will evolve. If this kind of supply-con-
straint is binding, and the availability of foreign currency
and imports is increased, one would expect an immediate
upturn in production. This is almost exactly what can be ob-
served in Mozambique directly after the implementation of
the ERP. However, another element of the ERP was the
gradual liberalization of the market for foreign currency.
This implied that the metical was devalued continuously
over the late 1980's, making the domestic price of imports
rise. With the described link between imports and output
supply, the bottle-neck may actually have narrowed again
around the turn of the decade. This special feature of pro-
duction technology may thus provide a partial explanation
of the stagnation following the implementation of the ERP
with a three-year lag.
Another aspect of the ERP itself concerns the monetary and
credit policy. Pivotal to almost every structuralist adjust-
ment programme is the ambition to reduce inflation. Avail-
able monetary instruments are applied to reduce the growth
of the money and credit supply, as the links between money
supply and inflation are essential according to the theoreti-
cal origins of the structural adjustment programmes. To be-
lieve in this prescription, one really has to "swallow a
camel", and that is that the implemented monetary policy
has no or few negative real effects. To the extent that Mo-
zambique is producing at a natural price-inelastic full-em-
ployment level, tight money and credit policy may leave
GDP unchanged, and inflation may be brought down. How-
ever, assuming that a contraction of the credit volume will
leave production levels unchanged is quite absurd, espe-
cially for a country like Mozambique.
Accompanied by increasing real interest rates, the tight
monetary policy of ERP is likely to have had significant ne-
gative effect on the evolution of production levels, at least
in the short run. Not only has the credit-accessibility been
reduced, but the price of the available credit has also esca-
lated. One may dispute the relevancy of this argument, as
the real interest rates are still very low, not to say negative.
However, the rise in financial costs is nonetheless real, both
for consumers and producers. As short-term credit makes
up an important part of the variable costs of production in
typical developing countries, the credit squeeze has prob-
ably caused contractionary effects also via the supply-side
of the economy. Even more important, these supply side ef-
fects may have counteracted the overall anti-inflationary ob-
jective of the structural adjustment policy.
3.3 Looking ahead
To comment on the prospects for post-war development, it
may be useful to draw a distinction between the short term
and the medium to long term. Main immediate challenges
are embodied in keywords as demobilization, resettlement,
and emergency aid. On the other hand, the design of the
continued policy reform is of utmost importance for the
middle to longer-term growth and development possi-
bilities. The level of welfare and development is quite extra-
ordinary. Initially colonized by one of the backward nations
of Europe, the struggle for independence resulted in an ex-
haustive exodus in 1974. Misguided central planning and
civil war further worsened the overall economic situation
up to the middle of the 1980's. Although a certain turn-
around can be traced for the first years following the im-
plementation of the ERP, it is a highly relevant question
whether the inflow of aid in connection with the ERP has
been as effective as might be expected. Thus, the long run
issues of economic development and improved welfare still
remain completely unsolved.
Mozambique is today one of the most aid-dependent coun-
tries of the world, and per capita income qualifies the popu-
lation among the world's absolute poorest. Among the
clients of the World Bank, Mozambique relates to the rest
of Southern Africa as this region relates to the average
World Bank client. Therefore, it is striking how little this
special situation of Mozambique seem to have influenced
on the design of policy prescriptions. Rather, a strategy of
swift stabilization, liberalization, deregulation, and privatiz-
ation seem to have been imposed on a country lacking most
basic prerequisites for economic progress. This has left Mo-
zambique as one of the most debt-ridden and aid-dependent
countries of the world, whereas the benefits seem at least
questionable.
Food support and emergency aid will have to dominate the
use of capital inflow in Mozambique in many years to
come. The rural poor have no buffer whatsoever, by which
they could meet the climatic variations, and thus they are ex-
tremely vulnerable. In the short run, extensive attention will
also have to be given to the problems concerning demobili-
zation and resettlement. This is a critical factor in creating
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the premises for a supportive environment in the medium to
longer term, not only for economic development, but also
for political stability. These efforts will take up a significant
part of public expenses over the next years, whereas the
economic benefits in terms of increased production and
economic growth must be awaited with patience.
Regarding the economic policy design, Mozambique is now
in many respects floating down a river of no return. Most
parts of the process that has been launched are irreversible.
This implies that the policy measures must be concentrated
on adjusting the speed and exact direction of the initiated
movement, as the main lines are largely predetermined by
the ongoing economic reforms. In addition, the sequencing
of the different parts of the programmes can still be control-
led, and this instrument should be applied to foster elements
regarded as influential, and to bridle any parts that are to be
considered as ineffective or out of time/place. The overall
objectives of the new National Reconstruction Plan (NRP)
are the reduction of poverty, enhancement of growth and ad-
ministrative training. Except for stressing the importance of
institution-building, management training and human capi-
tal formation, nothing much has changed since the im-
plementation of the ERP. One exception is the long-term ex-
ternal conditions, which have improved significantly after
the civil war was brought to an end. The new security situ-
ation and the revised objectives of policy reform are promi-
sing to the extent that they may allow a larger share of the
total inflow of grants and loans to benefit small-scale indus-
try and farming in rural areas. This would mean a signifi-
cant improvement, as the inflow of aid over the last years
largely has been concentrated to urban and/or typically se-
cure areas.
Today's Mozambique is characterized by a highly shattered
economic environment. In addition, the country's situation
will be one of deep economic crisis for years to come. Both
human and physical capital is desperately needed to gener-
ate any increase in welfare levels. The most serious mistake
analysts may make in designing the economic policy for
Mozambique is to believe uncritically that this economy
will react to macroeconomic policy instruments according
to the same rules that seem to apply for the countries of the
industrialized part of the world.
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4. Ten countries in sub - Saharan Africa
4.1 Introduction
In order to construct indicators for social and economic per-
formance and development, the World Bank's World
Tables 1992 have been consulted to establish a panel data
set for ten countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Many consider-
ations influenced the selection of countries. First, to the ex-
tent that the data availability allowed it, the main cooper-
ators of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooper-
ation (NORAD) were given preference. Unfortunately,
Namibia have to be excluded due to lack of data, leaving us
with five countries of the above described category. Sec-
ond, five more countries were included to increase the total
number of observations for the planned econometric
studies. These countries are located in the same regions as
the main cooperators of NORAD, to some degree sharing
social, political, and economic characteristics with the rest












The country-specific time series range over the period 1980
to 1991 (12 years), giving a total of 120 observations. In
World Tables 1992, the information on Mozambique is very
scarce, and therefore supplementary sources have been used
to construct time series for Mozambique that correspond to
those of the other countries. These sources include The
World Bank (1992b) and IMF (1992). For some of the other
countries there were also "holes" in the World Tables, and
these are repaired by using alternative data sources (mainly
IMF [1993]), and in a few cases by extrapolation. Still, well
above 95% of the records of the panel are the untouched
figures from the data base produced by the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
4.2 Regional differences in population and
production
The countries in our data set are very different, and the aim
of the following exposition will be to shed some light on the
most important variations. Table 4.1 reproduces some demo-
graphic characteristics of the countries involved. The total
fertility rate is the total number of child births per woman
through the fertile ages, and indicates the growth potential
of the population. For Mozambique, the fertility is close to
the average for the ten countries of the table. Botswana and
Zimbabwe are countries with comparatively low rates of
total fertility, whereas Malawi and Rwanda stand out as
countries where the average number of children per woman
is relatively high.
The infant mortality rates measure the number of children
per thousand who die every year before reaching one year
of age. For this indicator, the simple average for the ten
countries is 99, and thus Mozambique lies well above most
of the other countries with respect to infant mortality. Fur-
ther, there are only two countries with a lower life expec-
tancy than Mozambique. Although crude, these two
measures indicate that social conditions are relatively poor
in Mozambique compared to the rest of the sample. The rate
of urbanization is not outstanding in any direction in Mo-
zambique, but as the civil war has made people flee to the
cities, the rural population must be expected to increase con-
siderably more than the urban population in the years to






















Botswana 4.5 36.4 67.6 29.0 1.29
Burundi 6.8 106.0 46.7 5.7 5.60
Ethiopia 7.5 129.8 48.3 13.3 52.89
Kenya 6.5 65.7 59.0 24.4 25.02
Malawi 7.6 149.2 46.2 12.1 8.80
Mozambique 6.5 136.3 46.8 28.3 16.14
Rwanda 8.3 119.8 47.9 8.0 7.40
Tanzania 6.6 115.3 47.3 34.3 25.27
Zambia 6.7 82.8 48.7 50.8 8.37
Zimbabwe 4.8 47.6 60.4 28.3 10.08
21











0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 3 000
Figure 4.2 Per capita net official transfers In 1991 (US$) 	
1
Structural Adjustment in Mozambique 	 Rapporter 94/11
Mozambique is almost exactly average size in the con-
structed panel. Observe also the dramatic variation between
countries with respect to population size. Botswana is small
with its 1.3 million inhabitants, whereas Ethiopia must feed
a population 40 times larger than that of Botswana. This
variation should be kept in mind when figure 4.1 is exam-
ined.
Figure 4.1 illustrates how per capita gross national product
varied over the ten countries in 1991. Gross national pro-
duct includes gross domestic product at market prices plus
factor income from abroad. Botswana seems to be ex-
tremely rich compared to the rest of the sample. This is also
true, and with vast mineral resources and large foreign
reserves, Botswana is receiving reduced attention from the
multilateral donor community.
On the other hand, Mozambique is on the bottom of the
scale with an estimated US$ 70 per capita GNP. Accord-
ingly, one should think that Mozambique would have a
correspondingly high priority with the donors.
0 	 50 	 100 	 150 	 200
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But Mozambique is not the only country characterized by
low per capita income figures. Other extremely poor coun-
tries include Burundi (US$ 210), Ethiopia (US$ 120), Ma-
lawi (US$ 230), and Tanzania (US$ 100). Except from Bot-
swana, the most well-off country seem to be Zimbabwe,
with US$ 610 in per capita GAP.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the variation in per capita net official
transfers, as reported by the World Bank in World Tables
1991. Net official transfers comprise net transfer payment
between governments of the reporting country and the rest
of the world, and thus they should pick up quite a bit of
what is referred to as development aid.
Again, the most striking feature concerns Botswana. It
seems that Botswana has received transfers from govern-
ments of the rest of the world amounting to more than US$
230 per capita in 1991. The low population of Botswana
tend to inflate the inflow of development aid, when
measured in per capita terms. The country also has several
advantages that make her especially popular among the do-
nors. During the 1980's, Botswana was located on the fron-
tier to apartheid, and gained considerable support for hold-
ing South Africa at a distance. In addition, Botswana has a
tradition of peace and democracy, both extremely important
prerequisites for development cooperation and for econ-
omic growth. The mineral resources of Botswana have also
contributed to the rapid formation of substantial liquid na-
tional wealth. Among the other countries of interest we ob-
serve that together with Burundi, Mozambique received
relatively much in the form of net official transfers com-
pared to other countries in the region. Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Malawi are localized near the bottom of the scale, partly
due to political controversies in recent years. However,
there is reason to believe that this situation can be improved
if the political unrest is settled.
A dramatic inflow of development aid may also have cre-
ated unhealthy structural mechanisms in the economy.
These effects are described in a theoretical context by van
Wijnbergen (1984), where it is argued that continuous in-
flow of capital in the form of development aid may have ef-
fects similar to those of petroleum income, causing the so-
called Dutch disease. The idea of the Dutch disease is that a
constant (costless) inflow of foreign currency may have ad-
verse effects, as they often cause resources to be directed
from production of tradeables towards production of untra-
deable goods. The resulting increased competition for do-
mestic inputs make production costs increase in both sec-
tors, and on impact the terms of trade deteriorate. Over
time, the downscaling of the competitive industry may also
have additional negative effects on the competitiveness, as
human capital formation usually depends on the general
level of activity (learning-by-doing effects).
Figure 4.3 summarizes the economic growth performance
for the ten countries over the 1980's. And again the winner
is Botswana. With an annual growth rate of 10% in both
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Figure 4.3 Average annual GOP growth (%)1980-1991 Figure 4.4 Average annual monetary growth (%)1980.11991
rate of economic development. Burundi has also had stable
and satisfactory growth rates over all twelve years, but the
level at which this country still struggle still makes it trans-
fer-deserving (cf. fig 4.2). The most dramatic turnaround
seems to have taken place in Mozambique, where an aver-
age growth rate of —5% during the period 1980-1985 has
been transformed to a positive average annual growth of
about 4% over the last half of the 1980's. As we saw in the
last chapter, this development is about to stagnate, but the
prospects for post-war Mozambique should still be promi-
sing. Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania are other coun-
tries where the economic development seems to have been
accelerating over the last decade.
Rwanda reveals a somewhat bleak pattern in figure 4.3, as
the turnaround for this country has the wrong sign. From a
steady annual growth of almost 3%, the GDP growth has
stagnated, and over the last half of the 1980's domestic pro-
duction has fallen by more than 2% a year. For Zimbabwe,
the situation is comparable to that of Rwanda, as the GDP
growth rate has fallen from 4% to 1% over the period. Zam-
bia has been a typical on/off adjustor, and the absence of a
significant turnaround in production must be analyzed with
this feature in mind.
4.3 Monetary growth and inflation
As pointed out in chapter 2, monetarists tend to stress the
links between the money supply mechanisms and inflation.
This section reports the actual figures on the subject for our
sub-Saharan panel. Figure 4.4 illustrates the annual growth
in money supply over the period. The applied definition of
the money supply is broad, including all monetary and
quasi-monetary liabilities of the country's financial institu-
tions to residents other than the central government. In
spite of the efforts made by the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, only two of the countries of our
sample have actually reduced the growth in the money sup-
ply over the 1980's. These countries are Burundi and
Rwanda. All the other countries report a higher growth in
the money supply over the last six years than over the first
six-year period.
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Malawi seem to have had a very
moderate acceleration in the growth of the money supply.
For all the other countries the growth in the money supply
has increased significantly over the 1980's. Mozambique
stands out with the highest monetary growth rate for the
first half of the decade, and the second highest rate of
growth during the last period. Only Zambia has experienced
a more dramatic acceleration in the monetary growth rate
than Mozambique. Along with Tanzania, Zambia, and Zim-
babwe, the monetary growth has also been extraordinary in
Botswana. However, for Botswana an accompanying
growth in production seems to have suppressed the inflation-
ary impulses of the money supply. Thus the growth in the
money supply poses a threat to inflation primarily if the le-
vels of production have stagnated, as confirmed by figure
4.5.
Figure 4.5 reports the average growth in the consumer price
index, or in other words, the average annual rate of inflation
for our panel of sub-Saharan countries. In figure 4.5, six out
of ten countries seem to have reduced their annual rates of
inflation over the 1980's. This is somewhat in contrast with
figure 4.4, where only two out of ten countries have re-
duced their annual monetary growth over the same period.
Tanzania is an example, revealing a dramatic increase in the
monetary growth rate in figure 4.4, whereas the rate of infla-
tion seems to be reduced over the decade.
Not surprisingly, however, most of the countries charac-
terized by high rates of inflation are also countries with
high rates of monetary growth and/or low growth in produc-
tion. Thus, Mozambique is one of the countries with very
high inflation, especially over the last sub-period. However,
the immediate impression is that the monetary growth and
the growth of production do not suffice to explain the sharp
increase in inflation rates in Mozambique towards 1990.
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63%, monetary growth by half this distance, whereas the
growth in production has increased sharply. Thus, the rapid
inflation in Mozambique over the last part of the 1980's
seems to need supplementary explanations in addition to the
growth rates of money supply and production. Zambia is an-
other country where inflation has increased dramatically
over the 1980's. This corresponds well with the message
from figure 4.4, where the highest monetary growth rate
over the last sub-period is reported for Zambia. Somewhat
more striking is the inflation performance in Zimbabwe. In
spite of an increasing monetary growth rate and stagnating
GDP growth, Zimbabwe reports a decreasing rate of infla-
tion.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate some important problems
about macroeconomic analysis for developing countries.
Combined with the general growth performance, the figures
shed some light on the macroeconomic relationship be-
tween the growth in production, the growth in the money
supply, and inflation. On the other hand, the tendencies are
weak and unstable, implying that firm conclusions under no
circumstance can be drawn.
4.4 Interest rates
Chapter 3 gave a brief comment on the rationale for finan-
cial sector reforms in developing economies. These are de-
signed by the multilateral donors in order to improve the
quality and efficiency of the financial system. As we have
seen, the lifting of interest rate regulations is an important
element of these financial sector reforms. Figure 4.6 reports
average nominal lending rates for our ten sub-Saharan coun-
tries. For half of the countries in the sample, there has been
a sharp increase in nominal interest rates over the 1980's.
These are Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and
Zambia. Two countries (Burundi and Rwanda) reveal insig-
nificant variation over the ten-year period, whereas three
countries (Botswana, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe) have re-
duced their nominal lending rates. However, as most econ-
omic agents respond to real interest rates, figure 4.6 is
limited to illustrating the actual action taken to deregulate
nominal interest rates.
The impact of deregulation and the macroeconomic policies
on real interest rates are examined in figure 4.7. The real in-
terest rates are calculated by subtracting the rate of inflation
from the nominal interest rates illustrated in figure 4.6, and
these measures provide a measure of the real cost of credit,
as inflation over time will reduce the value of a given
amount of credit. According to figure 4.7, only two coun-
tries have seen an increase in the cost of credit over the
whole period. These are Kenya and Tanzania. The real cost
of credit seems to have fallen for the rest of the countries
from the first to the second sub-period.
The point of establishing positive real interest rates is often
underlined in the financial sector reform programmes. Fig-
ure 4.7 illustrates that seven countries seem to have had
positive real interest rates over the first half of the decade,
whereas this number is reduced to four over the second sub-
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period. Again, Mozambique and Zambia stand out at the
bottom of the scale, with negative and falling real interest
rates over the whole period, in spite of the fact that nominal
interest rates have escalated sharply during the decade in
both these countries.
4.5 Terms of trade and the current account
A characteristic element of almost every structural adjust-
ment program is the outward orientation of economic pol-
icy. Rapid devaluations of the currency are undertaken to
improve the competitiveness, again increasing exports, and
increasing the ability to pay for imports. The terms of trade
are defined as export prices compared with import prices,
and thus they measure the ratios at which the exports of one
country will exchange for those of its trading partners. For
small open economies, the terms of trade are exogenously
fixed by world market prices, at least for a constant pattern
of trade. But the terms of trade may be increased if the trade
pattern is adjusted to facilitate an improved exploitation of
comparative cost-advantages. When calculated as the ratio
of a country's index of average export prices to the average
import price index, the result is an index for the terms of
trade.
In figure 4.8 such an index forms the basis for the reported
terms of trade adjustment. An increase in the reported index
means an improvement in the terms of trade. Thus, for six
out of ten countries figure 4.8 implies a deterioration in
competitiveness.
This worsening in the terms of trade is most significant for
Burundi, Malawi, and Rwanda, while Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Zimbabwe seem to have experienced more moderate nega-
tive changes in competitiveness. Botswana is the only
country where the improvement in the terms of trade is sig-
nificant. However, a moderate improvement in the terms of
trade is also observed for Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zam-
bia. Figure 4.9 illustrate how the current account has de-
veloped over the 1980's. The reported current account is the
sum of net exports of goods and non-factor services, net fac-
tor service income, and net private transfers.
Botswana again reveals the most striking pattern, with a sig-
nificant improvement in the balance of the current account
over the decade. From an average annual deficit of about
12% of GDP, the current account of Botswana has turned
into an average annual surplus of 10% of GDP. This trend is
shared with Zimbabwe, which also seems to have turned the
current account deficit into a modest surplus during the
1980's. These are the only countries reporting an annual
average current account surplus over the period 1986 -
1991. However, there are some other countries that have im-
proved their situation by reducing the surplus. Among these
are Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda, and Zambia. The rest of the
sample report an increased current account deficit over the
1980's. Together with Tanzania, Mozambique represents
the most serious deterioration. For Mozambique, the aver-
age annual deficit has increased from 18.5% to 49% of
GDP. Whatever the explanations are for this development,
the economic policy of the 1980's can hardly be claimed to
have improved the medium-term balance of payments situ-
ation of the Mozambican economy.
The presentation of the data set has been rough, leaving for
the reader to draw conclusions regarding the implications of
structural adjustment. Generally, however, it seems that the
structural adjustment policies has succeeded only partially
in achieving their primary goals of reduced monetary
growth, improved terms of trade, reduced inflation, in-
creased real interest rates and economic growth. Further,
there is a certain tendency that countries with relatively
high monetary growth are better off than countries with
comparably low growth in the supply of broad money. To
be able to test these conclusions in a more rigid framework,
the next chapter applies econometric methods to the data set
presented above.
Figure 4.9 The current account as . percentage share of GDP
1980-1991
I
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5. Testing the impact of policy change
5.1 A heuristic model of growth
The analysis in this chapter applies a more rigid method to
analyze the data set presented in the previous chapter.
More precisely, the aim is to establish relations between out-
put growth and various explanatory variables. Hopefully,
this will reveal a bit more of how the change in selected
macroeconomic indicators has influenced the evolution of
the gross domestic product over the twelve-year period
from 1980 to 1991. Econometrics provides us with a scien-
tific method in which the tools of economic theory, mathe-
matics, and statistical inference are applied to economic
phenomena. This enables us to fit mathematical models to a
given set of real world observations of the macroeconomy.
With macroeconomic time series for ten countries over a
twelve-year period, the total number of observations is 120.
This should suffice to test some simple but stringent hypo-
theses concerning macroeconomic policy in the countries of
our sample. The applied mathematical relations must be
general, in order to capture effects which are common to the
ten countries. However, as this study must be regarded as in-
troductory and cursory, the outline must necessarily be
rather sketchy. A reasonable point of departure seems to be
to explain the evolution of gross domestic product. This
corresponds to explaining the growth rate of the economy
for the ten countries of our panel. Thus, the dependent vari-
able of the below analysis is the rate of change in the gross
domestic product.
The next step is to select the independent, or explanatory,
variables. In concordance with the previous chapter, we
would like to test whether the most typical features of the
structural adjustment programme have contributed to the
growth in the gross domestic product. Ideally speaking, this
would require an exhaustive set of empirically-based beha-
vioural relations for the economy. As the scope of this work
is limited, we will have to go about the problems in alterna-
tive way.
A kind of heuristic approach has become quite typical when
the impact of structural adjustment is to be estimated by
econometric methods. Rather than specifying a full-blown
macroeconomic model, economists try to identify factors
which have affected the growth potential in the countries
which are studied. The World Bank reports reviewed by
Summers and Pritchett (1993) draw in part on such
methods, and recent work published in international jour-
nals confirm a growing consensus on this kind of methodo-
logy.
Faini et al. (1991) offer a statistical analysis based on
pooled time series for 93 developing countries, and the aim
is to identify the existence of a turnaround in macroecon-
omic indicators between the two periods 1978-1981 and
1982-1986. Stylized models are estimated where the
change i performance indicators are taken to depend on au-
tonomous policy changes, changes in the external environ-
ment, and on participation in IMF-World Bank adjustment
programs. After controlling for initial conditions and exter-
nal factors, Faini et al. (1991) find no evidence of a statisti-
cally significant improvement in macroeconomic perfor-
mance among loan recipient countries. However, the time
span of their analysis is short, suggesting that improvements
may still occur.
Morley (1992) applies a similar set of methods to analyze
the effects of devaluation during stabilization programmes
in developing countries. Based on pooled time series for 28
developing countries during the period 1973-1990, Morley
(1992) estimates a simple relationship between the capacity
utilization of the economy and different fiscal and monetary
variables, including the real exchange rate. This study sug-
gests that devaluations of the currency have significant ne-
gative effects on the volume of production. Further, it is ar-
gued that the process by which this link takes place is slugg-
ish, as the effect of devaluation takes two years to materi-
alize.
King and Levine (1993) represents a recent work in which
the links between the financial sector and the real sector are
investigated by means of econometric methods. Using a
panel data set for about 80 countries from 1960 through
1989, King and Levine (1993) study whether higher levels
of financial development are associated with economic de-
velopment. Regressing long-run per capital GDP growth
against a variety of financial indicators, it is concluded that
the levels of financial deepening are strongly and robustly
correlated with the general potential for economic develop-
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ment. Further, it is argued that the financial variables are
able to predict the subsequent values of the growth indica-
tors. From this, King and Levine (1993) conclude that there
is a clear causality between financial and real development,
but this conclusion is strongly contested by other economist-
s in the field (e.g. Lucas [1988]).
These three example should illustrate that the below model
relates to a certain heuristic tradition within empirical devel-
opment economics. The next step is to pick the macroecon-
omic indicators which are suspected to have influenced the
rate of economic development in our ten sub-Saharan coun-
tries. At the same time, these must be factors which may be
(and have been) manipulated by economic policy, or more
specifically by the structural adjustment programmes. Typi-
cal targets of the structural adjustment programmes include
the rate of monetary expansion, outward orientation, the ex-
change rate, the inflow of capital, and the interest rates.
First, we would like to include some sort of monetary vari-
able, as structural adjustment programmes typically include
rather strict controls with the money supply. A broadly
defined money supply can be taken to reflect the amount of
domestic credit to the economy. Financial markets charac-
terized by credit-rationing and interest rate regulations pro-
vide a direct link between the money supply and the volume
of domestic credit because of the direct monetary trans-
mission mechanism through the banking system. In addi-
tion, credit plays a special role in the production technology
in developing countries, being the only source of external
finance. This means that monetary policy might have a
stronger impact on the level of economic activity in develo-
ping countries than in industrialized countries. The mon-
etary variable of our model is approached through a broadly
defined money supply ( Me ), including all monetary and
quasi-monetary liabilities of a country's financial institution-
s to residents other than the central government.
Second, our analysis should include a variable which re-
flects the outward-orientation of almost every structural ad-
justment programme. The terms at which a country partici-
pate in the international markets for goods are important to
the growth potential for the economy as a whole. The terms
of trade index reported in World Tables ( ) is therefore in-
cluded as an explanatory variable in the below simplified
model of output growth. For a small open economy, the
prices of exports and imports are fixed by the world market,
and for given exports and imports, the level of the terms of
trade index will therefore be out of reach. However, structu-
ral adjustment implies an adjustment also in the countries'
trade with the rest of the world, and exports and imports are
therefore not constant. Accordingly, appropriate policy
measures may be applied to restructure exports and imports,
and this will push the terms of trade index upwards.
Third, we analyze the growth impact of changes in the
nominal exchange rate. As illustrated in chapter 2 and 3,
rapid devaluations of the domestic currency are almost pivo-
tal to the structural adjustment programs for sub-Saharan
Africa. This is done to neutralize the effect from domestic
inflation on the international competitiveness. However, the
real world effects of devaluations in developing countries
are strongly debated. As mentioned in chapter 2, devalu-
ations may have contractionary effects in developing coun-
tries. These effects are especially due to the crucial role of
imported inputs. To investigate whether devaluations seem
to have influenced on the growth and level of GDP, the
nominal exchange rate (Es ) is also included as an inde-
pendent variable in the below model.
Fourth, our investigation should also allow for positive
growth effects from capital inflow. It is often claimed that
development aid has significant short-term beneficial ef-
fects because it increases the import capacity of the econ-
omy. Imports are of extreme importance for the production
technology, especially for manufacturing industries. An-
nual net official transfers ( Fe ) are included to capture the
effects on domestic production originating from the inflow
of development aid.
Finally, the model should incorporate some of the ideas
from the financial development literature Financial sector
reforms are present in most structural adjustment pro-
grammes, and these include a set of policy measures. De-
regulations of the credit markets are intended to smooth the
flow of funds from savers toward real investment. At the
same time, credit is the only source of external finance for
the producers, and liberalization of interest rates there im-
plies an increase in the costs of finance, and the marginal
costs of production. Nominal interest rates ( Re ) are intro-
duced to test these hypotheses in an empirical framework.
In standard macroeconomic approaches, the effects of all
these monetary variables are closely interrelated, and iso-
lated effects on the gross domestic product are therefore nor-
mally difficult to identify. For example, the effects on econ-
omic activity from interest rate changes are usually closely
correlated with the effects of general monetary factors, such
as capital inflow, exchange rates and monetary growth.
Thus it would be hard, not to say impossible, to isolate inter-
est rate effects from other monetary effects in a model of
this type for an industrialized country with competitive mar-
kets for money and capital.
However, the access to domestic and international financial
markets has been strictly regulated in all the countries of
our sample Access to official domestic credit have tradi-
tionally been restricted by credit ceilings and interest rate
regulations, and these are generally under public control.
Markets for foreign exchange have also been administered
over the entire period, as the exchange rates have been
fixed, and determined by the central bank according to rul-
ing principles of economic policy. In addition, official mar-
kets for foreign exchange have been close to absent, and the
distribution of this rationed asset has been undertaken by
the public administration. The problems concerning endoge-
neity and simultaneity may thus not be too severe when we
deal with data for developing countries, like the ones in our
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sample. It follows that a simplified short run model of
growth for this kind of countries may include monetary
growth, exchange rates and interest rates as explanatory
variables.
The listed set of variables does not at all constitute an ex-
haustive set of macroeconomic growth factors. Of course,
this study neglects a number of interesting magnitudes
which are suspected to influence the rate of economic
growth. Recent works of economic growth has pointed out
the importance of human capital formation (e.g. Lucas
[1988, 1993]), and it would therefore be of interest to in-
clude a variable to account for the variation over countries,
and over time, in the change and level of education. How-
ever, the different reported school enrolment ratios show
little variation over time, and therefore they are likely to be
correlated with the constant term of our estimated models.
There is also a serious lack of data when this information is
to be gathered for the ten countries of our panel.
Another variable that may have interest is the public budget
deficit. In the short run, one would expect that an increase
in the budget deficit would stimulate aggregate demand, but
the long run effect is often claimed to be adverse with re-
spect to economic growth. Unfortunately, the sources of the
data set are not generous enough to let us include the budget
deficit as an explanatory variable.
5.2 Econometric specification
The next step is to specify the relationship which is to form
the basis for the econometric estimation. Our model include
the real gross domestic product as a dependent variable.
The explanatory variables are the money supply ( Me ), a
terms of trade index ( T, ), the nominal exchange rate
(Es ), annual net official transfers ( Ft ), and the nominal in-
terest rate ( Re ). As a point of reference, we assume that a
long-run economic relationship exists between the level of
the gross national product and the independent variables in-
troduced above. The idea is that any long-run real national
income level ( Y, ) is associated with a specific level of the
above listed independent variables through a long-term
equilibrium structure.
This long-run relationship may be stated generally as:
(11) Yt =g(111,,T t ,E t ,F o R t )
where g(•) is the mathematical correspondence between the
long-run level of the gross domestic product and the
exogenous policy variables. For competitive economies,
monetarists would typically claim that the influence of mon-
etary factors on this long-run equilibrium is zero
( g'm = 0 ). An improvement in the terms of trade are likely
to have positive influence on evolution of GDP ( g'T > 0 ),
while the effects of devaluations are strongly debated
(g = ? ). To the extent that the recorded net official trans-
fers embodies the variation in the inflow of development
aid, the effect on the national income is usually assumed to
be non-negative ( g'm 0 ). Deregulating the financial sec-
tor means a liberalization of interest rates, and this is as-
sumed to be growth promoting ( g'R > 0 ). Our results will
hopefully enable us to draw conclusions regarding the ex-
tent to which these general results seem valid for the develo-
ping economies of our data set. For simplicity of exposition
and to facilitate a convenient interpretation of the results,
the explicit formulation of the above function is charac-
terized as multiplicative:
(12) yt = A/WI 71;42 EcL3 J4 Rta5
where A is a constant term. Equation (12) now implies that
the a • 's (j = 1, 2, 3, 4 ) can be interpreted as partial elas-
ticities, representing the percentual change in national in-
come accompanied by a one per cent increase in the actual
independent variable. Furthermore, this functional form is
especially convenient for simple econometric analysis (ordi-
nary least squares), where linearity in the parameters is a re-
quired property for estimation of the parameters. We now
may transform equation (12) to read:
(13) y, = ao + a i mt + a2 t„ + a3 et + ft + a5 rt
where ao InA and small types generally represent the natu-
ral logarithm of the corresponding capitals ( x, laXt ).
Equation (13) represents the long-run relationship of our
model, and may describe theoretical phenomena pretty well.
However, the real world is typically characterized by
shocks and rigidities, to which the economy must respond
continuously. The process by which our data set was gener-
ated will typically reflect these dynamics, and equation (13)
will have limited value when real-world phenomena are to
be described. What is required is therefore a dynamic model
which implicitly encompasses a long-run economic relation-
ship like the one in equation (13).
This need is met by the error-correction model, where the
change in the left-hand variable depends on changes in the
explanatory variables in addition to a so-called error-correc-
tion term (Engle and Granger [1987]). The error-correction
term reflects the deviation from the lagged long-run equili-
brium of equation (13). Accordingly, this variable's par-
ameter, the error-correction coefficient, reflects the share of
the deviation from the long-run equilibrium which is equili-
brated in every period. Thus, the error-correction coefficient
serves as a measure of the sluggishness in the dynamic pro-
cess behind the data set. Letting , denote the percentual
change over time in the variable X, and introducing ut as
white empirical noise, the empirical error-correction formu-
lation corresponding to equation (13) is given by: 1
1 Formally, the relative time derivative is defined by:
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(14) j7„ = + 	 „+ a21,+ a 3e. „ + a4f,+ a5r,+	 + u,
where X is the error-correction coefficient, and ecmt is the
so-called error-correction mechanism, defined by:
(15) ecm, = y, - [ao + a i m, + a2t, + a3e, + ag ft + a5r,
We are now ready to formulate the estimated econometric
equation, from which both short-run and long-run effects
may be derived. Letting subscript i denote the different
countries of the sample and introducing a io country-specific
fixed effects, the econometric equation which is estimated
is given by:
(16) Y it = (7,0 + a l Mit + a2 ti, + a3 eit + a4lit + a5
	b0 Y	 b1 mit--1	 b3 e
	+ 64 f	 it-1 + b5 	+ u,„
The coefficients of the differentiated variables may now be
interpreted as short-run effects of shifts in the macroecon-
omic policy, whereas the level-effects are more closely con-
nected to the underlying long-run equilibrium. Indeed, from
an estimated version of equation (16) estimates for the long-
run parameters of equation (13) can be derived as:
j = 1,2,3,4,5
Table 5.1 Estimated growth impulses
Dependent variable: GDP growth (pt ), estimation
method: Ordinary Least Squares.
Variables Model 1 	 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mit 0.07 - 0.04 0.05 0.05 -
t it 0.01 0.01 0.01
eit -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
fit 0.00 0.01 0.00
f it -0.24 -0.21 -0.24 - 0.25**
Yi t-1 -0.14 -0.11 *** -0.13 - 0.11 ***
mi t-i 0.02 0.02 0.03
***
0.03 -
ti t-1 0.04 0.04 - 0.04
*lc*
0.04-
e i t-1 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
f it-1 -0.00 0.01 0.00
r it-1 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.05
CON ST 0.39 -0.14
BWA 0.07- 0.07 - 0.07-
BDI 0.02 0.02 0.02 **
ETH -0.00







R 2=0.49 R 2=0.60 R2=0.59 R 2 =0.59
F(12, 98) =7.1 F(21$9) = 6.44 	 F(14, 96) =9.9 F(9, 101) = 15.9
*** Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 10% level.
Significant at 10% level with a one-tailed test.
I) Mozambique serves as the point of reference in this model.
A
A 	 "i0
(17) aio = To-
A
a -= gio
s.e. = 0.041 	 s.e. = 0.037 	 s.e. = 0.036 	 s.e. = 0.035
70
2(2) = 2.6 	 x2(2) = 7.1 	 x 2 (2) = 9.2 	 X2(2) = 7.2
V i
Consequently, the specification in equation (16) opens for
both short-run and long-run effects originating from shifts
in the explanatory variables. This concludes the general for-
mulation of an econometric model, and we now turn to the
estimated results.
5.3 Estimation
The data set is transformed to fit the formulation of equa-
tion (16), and the relation is then estimated by ordinary least
squares. Different versions of the model are tried out, and a
small subset of the estimated models is presented in table
5.1.
The first four lines of the table contain the effects of dif-
ferentiated exogenous variables, and may be interpreted as
short-run elasticities. Then there are five lines for lagged
level-effects, followed by the common constant term.
Country-specific fixed effects are captured by the last ten
lines of table 5.1, and the abbreviations correspond to those
defined in section 5.1. We will first comment on the techni-
cal differences between the versions of the model, before re-
sults concerning economic effects and policy implications
are discussed more thoroughly.
The first model excludes any variation between the coun-
tries of the sample, except due to the included explanatory
variables, as all country-specific constant terms are left out.
The constant term of the model may be interpreted as the au-
tonomous rate of growth, or the rate of evolution in the
gross domestic product which cannot be attributed to any of
the other explanatory variables. Thus, model 1 implicitly as-
sumes that the degree to which variation in the explanatory
variables explains changes in aggregate output is identical
between the ten countries.
There may, however, be constant country-specific effects
that have affected the economic growth potential over the
1980's. To take one example, the mineral resources of Bot-
swana may have improved the general economic climate
relative to the other nine countries. Another example is the
variation over countries in the educational level of the popu-
lation. This must be assumed to influence the variation in
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the growth rates between the countries. A crude measure is
introduced in model 2 to control for such country-specific
variations in the autonomous rate of GDP growth.
Model 2 incorporates all the effects of equation (16), and
may thus be referred to as the full-blown version of our
simple model of economic growth. This model includes a
maximum of variables in addition to the country-specific
constant terms. The constant term is allowed to vary over
the countries in the sample to isolate the growth effects of
the four ordinary independent variables. To be able estimate
the model by econometric methods, one of the country-spe-
cific constant terms had to be left out. Therefore, in the sec-
ond model Mozambique serves as a reference country from
which all the other country-specific constant terms are
measured as deviations. However, the results from this sec-
ond step of the procedure indicates that quite a few of the
country-specific fixed effects do not deserve their position
in the model, as they do not deviate significantly from zero.
The next step therefore excluded the insignificant country-
specific dummy variables as well as the common constant
term, leaving us with the results of the third column of table
5.1.
The last step of the estimation procedure was to exclude
also the ordinary explanatory variables which do not seem
able to contribute significantly to the explanation of the rate
of economic growth. The result is the "final" version of the
model, and this is reported in the far-right column of table
5.1. In this preferred version of the model, the selection of
country-specific fixed effects reflects the statistical signific-
ance of such effects, and so does the included explanatory
variables.
The establishment of the estimated econometric equation
may thus be divided into four steps: the estimation of the
general version of the model, the estimation of the full-
blown model, the selection of country-specific fixed effects,
and finally, the selection of ordinary explanatory variables.
We have started from a general specification and repeated
estimation has brought the model closer to a more specific
and restricted form. This is in consonance with general prin-
ciples of econometric modelling of time series.
In evaluating the different versions of the model, we have
utilized some statistical diagnostics, and these are reported
in the bottom line of table 5.1. The first indicator of the va-
lidity of the model is the R 2 , measuring the proportion of
the total variation in the dependent variable that is ex-
plained by the estimated model. None of the estimated
models are able explain more than 60 per cent of the vari-
ation in the data set, as measured by the reported R2 . The in-
terpretation of the results should therefore be exercised with
cautiousness. Second, the reported F-statistic indicates the
joint statistical significance of all the estimated parameters.
The null-hypothesis that all estimates are jointly equal to
zero is rejected for all the reported models. Third, the stand-
ard error of the estimation is reported. The standard error of
the regressions are quite high, but as we are working with
panel data for developing countries, one must expect quite a
bit of unexplained variation. Fourth, a X2 test statistic is
computed to test whether the residuals are normally dis-
tributed. Due to outliers, this hypothesis of non-normality is
rejected only for model 1. All these diagnostics have been
used in the gradual approach of the final preferred model,
and except from the Jarque and Bera (1980) test of nor-
mality, they have all improved during the procedures of esti-
mation. Statistical significance and a sign in accordance
with hypotheses in development economics should indicate
the relevance of the included variables, but the absolute size
of the different coefficients must be interpreted with care.
Further, econometric models that combine macroeconomic
time series for different countries can not easily be taken to
represent appropriate behavioral economic relationships.
However, the estimated effects in table 5.1 tell us some-
thing about the partial correlations between economic
growth and different other macroeconomic indicators.
5.4 Discussion of results
All results will be commented using model 4 as the central
reference. The other models of table 5.1 serve to illustrate
the procedures of estimation, where the aim has been to find
the model that describes the data-generating process in the
best way. On this background, model 4 seems preferable so
far. Below, the different elements of the model are dis-
cussed, starting with the country-specific constant terms.
The estimated effects of changes in the broad money sup-
ply, the terms of trade, devaluations of the domestic cur-
rency, net official transfers, and nominal interest rates are
then clarified. Finally, estimates for the underlying structu-
ral model are presented to shed some light on the long-run
underlying equilibrium, on which the growth model is con-
ditioned.
Country-specific fixed effects
The constant terms of the model are allowed to vary be-
tween the countries of the sample. Mozambique serve as the
point of reference in model 2, and the country-specific fixed
effects are measured as deviations from the constant term
for Mozambique (estimated to be zero). In model 4, fixed
growth effects are appended for three countries. The esti-
mated fixed country effects include both positive and nega-
tive coefficients. However, this does not automatically
mean that the growth rates vary according to the sign of
these fixed effects. Rather, the fixed effects are meant to iso-
late constant country-specific growth factors apart from the
included explanatory variables.
For all the countries of the sample there are many growth-
explaining variables that are left out of our model. If the
sum of these effects has been somewhat constant over the
estimation period, they are captured by the constant terms.
Thus, the fixed effects give a hint of how large proportion
of the variation in growth rates that cannot be explained by
variation in the ordinary explanatory variables of the model.
Thus they may be interpreted as some kind of "autono-
mous" rates of growth. For Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, the estimated
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fixed-effects do not seem significantly different from zero,
and therefore, (the average of) these countries serve as the
point of reference for model 3 and model 4. For the three
other countries of the sample there seem to be excluded con-
stant growth-factors that produce a significantly higher rate
of growth than for the rest of sample over the period. The
idea may be illuminated by the case of Botswana, where the
autonomous growth rate seem to be 5.5 percentage points
higher than for the other countries, e.g. Mozambique. This
suggests that Botswana may be an economy that is quite dif-
ferent from the Mozambican economy, and that all the im-
pulses to growth are not directly comparable for these two
economies. The variation exposed in the figures of chapter
4 seem to support this impression. Following the same line
of reasoning, Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zam-
bia, and Zimbabwe seem to be economies where the mech-
anisms of economic development to a larger extent are com-
parable to those of Mozambique.
Broad money
According to table 5.1, monetary growth seems to have had
a significant, but very modest, positive effect upon the
change in the gross domestic product over the 1980's. The
estimated short-run elasticity of broad money is positive
and relatively significant, but perhaps not as stable as we
ideally would like to see it. In the preferred model, mon-
etary growth has a positive estimate of about 0.05, and this
estimate is significantly positive at a 10% significance
level. This implies that it is likely that an expansion in the
volume of domestic credit has moderate positive effects on
the real rate of growth in the short run. On the other hand,
this result also implies that contractions of the monetary
base are likely to cause the gross domestic product to fall in
the short run. However, the coefficient of the lagged level
of broad money has even more interesting characteristics.
The partial level-effect of domestic credit is highly signifi-
cant in our final specification, and seems quite robust to the
different versions of the growth model. This suggests that
there exists a significant positive correlation between nomi-
nal money growth and the gross domestic product also in
the medium term. Thus, our data set lends support to the hy-
pothesis that changes in the volume of domestic credit are
positively correlated with the change of the national income
level. This reflects the observation that countries in our
sample which can show a relatively advantageous growth
performance usually also have monetary growth rates
higher than the sample average (cf. chapter 4).
As mentioned above, the estimates concerning broad money
suggest that the set of monetary constraints which usually
accompany the structural adjustment programmes might
have contractive effects on the economic growth potential
of the countries of our sample. This analysis suggests that
the monitoring of monetary growth should be exercised
with modesty if medium-term economic growth is the pri-
mary target of the macroeconomic policy. A tempting con-
clusion is further that the multinational donor community
concern with monetary control has been exaggerated, but as
the estimated effects of our model are very small, it is diffi-
cult to draw clear-cut conclusions. We should also remem-
ber from chapter 2 that there is a strong link between mon-
etary growth and inflation, and that inflation may have ad-
verse effects which require separate treatment.
Terms of trade
Macroeconomic balance, fiscal restraint, and outward-look-
ing policies are keywords of nearly all programs of structu-
ral adjustment. To test the importance of orientation to-
wards international goods-markets, our model of growth in-
clude an index for the terms of trade. This index is extracted
directly from World Tables 1992, and is intended to
measure the ratio at which the exports of one country ex-
change for those of its trading partners. For small open econ-
omies, both export and import prices are determined interna-
tionally, and for given amounts of export and imports, the
terms of trade are thus exogenous. However, the reported
index is defined as the index of average export prices
relative to the average import price index. Changes in quan-
tities of exports and imports will thus influence on the terms
of trade. An increase in the terms of trade may therefore be
interpreted as a movement towards a trade equilibrium
where comparative cost advantages are optimally exploited.
This kind of structural adjustment is claimed to be of vital
importance for the growth-potential of developing coun-
tries. Changes in the terms of trade index will therefore be
applied to reflect general variations in the international com-
petitiveness of the countries involved.
From table 5.1 we see that the immediate net effect upon
the economic growth rate from a change in the terms of
trade index is negligible. Therefore, this variable is ex-
cluded in the final specification of our model. However, the
estimated level effect lies very stable at 0.04 in all the differ-
ent specifications, and is highly significant in the final
preferred model. More precisely, the estimate suggests that
countries with improving terms of trade have performed sys-
tematically better than countries with constant terms of
trade over the 1980's. Adjustment of the trade pattern there-
fore seems to be of vital importance for the medium-term
growth potential, whereas the short-term effects of terms of
trade adjustment seem to be of minor importance.
The exchange rate
A devaluation means that import prices rise relative to ex-
port prices. If domestic exporters are producing competi-
tively and without rationing, this will normally bring about
an increase in exports. However, a devaluation also implies
that imports become relatively more expensive, and this ef-
fect should not be neglected, especially not in analyses of
developing countries. As imports are of extreme importance
in the production process in most developing countries, de-
valuations may have contractive effects via the supply side
of the economy, because they tend to increase the marginal
costs of production. This is stressed in a number of theoreti-
cal works on development economics, especially within the
neo-structural macro critique (e.g. Bruno [1979], Krugman
and Taylor [1978]), and is also pointed out by Cappelen
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(1992) in a recent comment on the economic recovery plan
in Mozambique.
Data for exchange rates are approached through the conver-
sion factors reported by the World Bank (1992b). This con-
version factor represents the annual average of market ex-
change rates for countries quoting rates in units of national
currency per US$. Further, an index is constructed to be
able to compare the evolution in the exchange rate between
the different countries of the sample. Accordingly, an in-
crease in this index of exchange rates will reflect a devalu-
ation of the currency, making the interpretation of the esti-
mated coefficients quite straight-forward.
The estimated short-run effect of changes in the exchange
rate does not support the hypothesis concerning contractive
effects of devaluation, at least when measured by the total
net effect on GDP growth. An increase in E t implies a de-
valuation of the nominal currency, and this seems to pro-
duce a modest, but statistically insignificant, negative effect
on the rate of growth, as reported in models 1-3. This short
run change in the exchange rate index is therefore excluded
int the final preferred version of the model. The estimated
level effect from changes in the exchange rate have similar
properties, and is also excluded in model 4.
The preferred model in table 5.1 thus seems to suggest that
the export-promoting effects of devaluations tend to balance
the contractive effects due to an import intensive production
technology. Seemingly, our estimated model of growth for
ten countries in Sub-Saharan Africa thus lends only limited
support to hypotheses concerning contractive effects of de-
valuation. However, there are certain statistical problems at
this point of the analysis. Partial regressions suggest that the
monetary growth rate is closely correlated with the rate of
devaluation. The reason for this might be that monetary
growth is used as an indicator of future inflation. As devalu-
ations have been implemented to counteract the effects on
the international competitiveness from domestic inflation,
this will cause a close relationship between monetary
growth and the exchange rate. This is a typical problem of
econometric analysis, and is referred to as multicollinearity.
The consequence of this property of the data set a low de-
gree of precision in the estimated coefficients. For our esti-
mated model it also implies that it will be hard to identify
the isolated effects on the economic growth rate from
changes in the money supply and adjustments of the ex-
change rates, respectively.
Net official transfers
Inflow of capital in the form of development aid is fre-
quently claimed to have substantial growth-promoting ef-
fects on developing countries, but various contributions
within the macroeconomic development literature now cast
doubt on this earlier quite generally accepted conclusion
(e.g. Cassen et al. [1986] and Pedersen [1991]).
As most of the countries in our sample are excluded from in-
ternational credit on market-based terms, inflow of capital
largely take place in form of subsidized credits and develop-
ment aid. Short-term demand-side effects are likely to occur
after changes in the net capital inflow of this type, but rent-
seeking and other non-productive activities may squeeze
out even the short-term effects of capital inflow. In the me-
dium to long-term there are important effects from net trans-
fers concerning macroeconomic structure and economic in-
centives (e.g. van Wijnbergen [1984]), and these may neu-
tralize the growth impact of net transfers. The empirical evi-
dence is, accordingly, ambiguous in this area. To test for the
influence of development aid, net official transfers has been
included in the estimated model.
Net official transfers comprise net transfer payments be-
tween governments of the reporting country and the rest of
the world. As chapter 4 revealed, this variable takes on high
values for Botswana. This suggests that the recorded vari-
able may include more than official development aid. Bot-
swana has generated international funds from their mining
activities. If net official transfers include some of the inter-
est payments from these funds, it would typically skew the
distribution in favour of Botswana, as none of the other
countries of the sample are likely to receive official interest
payments from abroad. This should be held in mind when
the results are interpreted.
Our estimated model of the far-right column of table 5.1
does not confirm either of the hypotheses concerning inflow
of aid and economic growth. The estimated short-term ef-
fect from a change in net official transfers is positive, but
very small, and not statistically significant, and is excluded
in the final version of the model. The level-effect is more
closely connected to the long-run equilibrium, but has simi-
lar properties, and is therefore also excluded in the
preferred model 4. As measured by net official transfers
over the 1980's, our model is thus not able to uncover in-
fluences from the inflow of development aid on the rate of
economic growth.
At this point, the model does not seem appropriate for an ex-
planation of the turnaround in Mozambique in 1987. As the
inflow of donor funds increased dramatically due to the im-
plementation of the ERP, growth rates turned significantly
positive in Mozambique. Over the last seven years, this indi-
cates a close relationship between the import capacity and
the rate of economic growth. On the other hand, the poten-
tial for a turnaround seem to have been exceptional in Mo-
zambique, due to the extraordinary macroeconomic, and se-
curity-related, conditions at the middle of the 1980's. Thus,
the inflow of capital to Mozambique may have been far
more effective for generating economic growth over the
short to medium term than for the other countries. To the ex-
tent that these effects are temporal, they also shed some
light on the stagnation that has taken place in Mozambique
after 1990. Expansionary effects of development aid are
likely to be relevant also for the other countries in the re-
gion, but our estimated model is not able to pick up these ef-
fects.
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Interest rates
The nominal interest rate is included to account for two dif-
ferent aspects of the macroeconomy in developing coun-
tries. First, an increase in interest rates is likely to produce a
contraction of the volume of production, because the imme-
diate response of investment demand will be negative. This
effect is identical to the one found in standard textbook ex-
positions of IS/LM-analysis. Second, the interest rate is in-
cluded to expose the effects from financial liberalization
upon the rates of economic growth. We therefore hypo-
thesize that interest rates have a negative short-term effect,
whereas the long-run structural effect from increasing inter-
est rates is positive.
The estimated immediate effect from an increase in the
nominal interest rates is negative, fairly stable and very sig-
nificant. This effect suggests a negative short-term growth
impulse from an increase in the real interest rates. In magni-
tude, the effect seems to be far more dramatic than of a
change in the broad money supply, and the estimate is also
more precise. Thus our data set lends support to the notion
that interest rates are negatively correlated with the level of
production in the short-run. The level effect is also rela-
tively stable, but not as significant as the short run effect of
interest rate changes. More interesting, perhaps, is the fact
that the estimated long-run effect has the opposite sign of
the short-run effect. The effect of an increase in interest
rates is thus expected to have a positive long-run influence
on the rate of economic growth.
This long-run result contradicts the standard hypothesis of
macroeconomic theory, but is well in line with the tradi-
tional literature of financial development (cf. Fry [1988]).
In industrialized countries, the interest rate tend to be nega-
tively correlated with the level of national output, also in
the medium term. A reason is that competitive capital mar-
kets redirect financial capital towards investment demand in
the case that interest rates should fall, and this contributes to
an increase in aggregate demand. Things look quite differ-
ent in representative developing countries.
First, the fixed interest rate ceilings place restrictions on the
supply of loans, and the volume of outstanding loans is less
than it otherwise would be. Second, the regulations of nomi-
nal interest rates usually imply low or negative real deposit
rates, and therefore nobody wants to place their savings
with the banking system unless for special reasons. Third,
low interest rates tend to cause capital flight, because the do-
mestic financial system can not compete with the interna-
tional capital market. Fourth, rationing in official financial
market almost inevitably give rise to grey or black markets
for credit, rising the marginal costs of finance dramatically.
Deregulations of the financial system is often claimed to
mobilize savings, both domestic and foreign. Further, the
banking system is affected, as financial resources can be
supplied to more profitable projects at a higher interest rate.
Accordingly, an increase in interest rates may cause an in-
crease also in the gross domestic product, at least in the
longer run.
The ideas that the real effects of interest rates changes have
a credit-availability channel which is special for developing
countries have been subject to theoretical and empirical re-
search for decades (Mohn [1992]). Influential early theoreti-
cal contributions include McKinnon (1973) and Shaw
(1973), and the literature on development economics has
been quite seriously concerned with the role of the financial
sector in the macroeconomy ever since (cf. Fry [1988]).
In an empirical study of macroeconomic investment beha-
viour in Greece, Voridis (1993) estimates robust and posi-
tive coefficients for user costs in his investment relations.
This is claimed to reflect the expansionary effect from in-
creasing interest rates on capital formation, again increasing
the availability of loanable funds. In a more general model,
using panel data for 80 countries, King and Levine (1993)
also finds strong support for the hypothesis that financial de-
velopment is positively correlated with the rate of economic
growth. Hence, the above estimated growth model for Sub-
Saharan countries can be taken to be in accordance with
these two recent empirical works on related topics.
The structural model
As pointed out under the specification of the econometric
model, specified growth model is conditioned on some
underlying long-term equilibrium relationship through the
so-called error-correction mechanism. The change in the
gross-national product is thus assumed to continuously re-
duce the deviation from an underlying long-term structural
equilibrium. The parameters of this underlying equilibrium
are derived by assuming that all changes approach zero, and
then solving for the dependent level variable. This solution
for the long-run structural elasticities is illustrated formally
by equation (17) above.
The estimates of the underlying long-run macro product
function are derived according to equation (17), and the re-
sulting structural elasticities are presented in table 5.2. As
we see, the long-run elasticities are directly related to the es-
timates of the growth model via the estimated error-correc-
tion coefficient. As the adjustment towards the long-run
equilibrium in table 5.2 is continuously hampered by the
sluggishness of the error-correction mechanism, the
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presented structural elasticities can not be taken too lite-
rally. The bottom line of table 5.2 reports the estimated
error-correction coefficient. The estimate of 0.11 implies
that only 11 per cent of the deviation from the deviation is
corrected in each period, suggesting a moderate pace of ad-
justment.
All the estimated structural parameters are consistent with
the previously commented effects in the dynamic model.
Therefore, the below presentation of implications will not
include any further discussion of the structural parameters.
For broad money the long-run structural elasticity is esti-
mated at 0.18. This implies that a one per cent increase in
the supply of broad money will increase the gross national
product by 0.18 per cent. For the terms of trade index the
long-run elasticity is estimated at 0.29. Thus, the influence
of improving terms of trade on the level of GDP seem to
have been significantly positive over the 1980's for the
countries of our sample. On impact, changes in the nominal
exchange rate effect do not seem to have had significant ef-
fects on the evolution of gross domestic product, but the iso-
lated effects from devaluations are hard to identify, as they
are closely correlated with the growth in the money supply.
The inflow of net official transfers seems not to be corre-
lated with the level of GDP in the medium to long-term, a
result which resembles the conclusions of Faini et al. (1991)
in their econometric evaluation of growth-oriented adjust-
ment programs. As pointed out above, net official transfers,
however, may be a inappropriate proxy for the inflow of de-
velopment aid, which is the main variable of interest. The
last structural parameter is the long-run elasticity of the
nominal interest rate, and this is positive and twice the mag-
nitude of the elasticity of broad money. This is in accord-
ance with the discussion above, and the conclusions con-
cerning interest rate deregulation and inflation control are
thus maintained.
Some of our results indicate that shifts in economic policy
may have short-term contractive effects, while the structural
parameters are positive. Further, the sluggishness of the esti-
mated error-correction model indicates that it may take con-
siderable time for policy shifts to increase the level of na-
tional income. Confronted with the real world dilemmas of
development economics, this is an important piece of infor-
mation, because it implies a general call for patience in the
evaluation of macroeconomic policy reforms.
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6. Simulations and policy experiments
6.1 Post-sample simulation
Any estimated econometric model should be subject to
simple tests of validity, and some such tests may easily be
constructed using the data set and the fitted equation. An il-
lustrative and quite transparent test is to simulate the model
using historical data, to see how well it describes the devel-
opment which formed the basis for estimation. The Mozam-
bican economy forms the point of reference for all the
examples and simulations presented below.
To investigate the performance of our single-equation
model, it is simulated using historical data for Mozambique
over the period 1980 to 1991. Simulations on observations
prior to 1986 revealed that for the early years of the sample,
our model does not seem appropriate for explaining the
growth in domestic production in Mozambique. The predic-
tions for the beginning of the eighties were far higher than
the observed economic development. This suggests that
other factors influenced the rate of growth over this period
than those embodied in our model. However, we must re-
member that we are simulating an economy at civil war.
The general social and economic instability associated with
the civil-war situation are likely to have caused rather er-
ratic shifts in the level of economic activity, and these can
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power of our equation, however, seem to improve consider-
ably as the Mozambican government joined the multina-
tional donor community, and initiated the first structural ad-
justment plan in 1987. For some of the last years of the eigh-
ties, our model projects rates of growth which are quite near
the realized growth of the Mozambican economy. Thus the
estimated model seem to capture quite a lot of the variation
in gross domestic product. Somehow, the insecurity situ-
ation might have settled by this time, stabilizing the econ-
omy at a level reflecting all adverse effects of the civil war.
Figure 6.1 illustrates some one of the problems which were
discussed at greater length in chapter 3. The first three years
following the implementation of the ERP were charac-
terized by positive and steady growth at an annual 4-5 per
cent. Toward the beginning of the 1990's, the growth poten-
tial seems to have stagnated, and figure 6.1 illustrates that
this stagnation can not be attributed to variation in the mac-
roeconomic indicators of our simple model. Speaking in
terms of our model, the recent delay of economic develop-
ment in Mozambique remains unexplained. For discussions
of ad hoc explanations, cf. chapter 3.
One may well object that the estimated model provides a
rather dubious description of the macroeconomic growth
rate during the last decade. However, one should take into
account the fact that our model consists of only one equa-
tion. Further, the modest aim is to explain the economic
mechanisms of a developing country at war, using only
three macroeconomic indicators. In this perspective, the
model's predictive power may nonetheless be approved of.
6.2 The reference scenario
In the following, we shall conduct some experimental pro-
jections of the macroeconomic level of activity and its re-
sponse to policy-shifts, using the Mozambican economy as
an example. The initial year of these simulations is 1993,
and the model is calibrated to fit this year's observations
perfectly. For the future years of our simulations, we need
precise assumptions regarding the evolution in the
exogenous variables. Further, in order to throw the effects
of the exogenous policy shocks into relief, we also need to
establish some kind of reference scenario, against which the
effects of economic policy shifts can be compared. This
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base line projection over twenty years is built on assump-
tions which largely extrapolate the late development in the
different exogenous variables.
The reference scenario for Mozambique is established as
follows. First, we assume a constant monetary growth rate
25 per cent. This magnitude is also representative for the
monetary growth over the last five years, and may be
looked upon as an average over the growth in the broad
money supply over recent years. Second, the observed dete-
rioration of the terms of trade is extrapolated, implying a
2.5 per cent annual decrease in the terms of trade index. Fi-
nally, we take the interest rate to be constant at 37 per cent,
which is reported by IMF (1993) to be the relevant interest
rate for 1993. Figure 6.2 presents the annual levels of GDP
for the reference scenario, whereas the projected growth
rates are illustrated in figure 6.3. Observe that the rate of
growth is falling over time also in the reference alternative,
reflecting the assumed continuous deterioration of the terms
of trade, and the fact that the error-correction mechanism re-
duces the rate of growth as the GDP level increases. Over
Projected annual growth rates in per cent
the twenty year projected period, the reference scenario im-
plies an average annual growth rate of 4.3 per cent. This
allows the gross domestic product of Mozambique to
double about every fifteen years.
The next step is to introduce the policy experiments. In
general, there are two main groups of alternatives when we
are to implement exogenous changes in our model. First,
one may shift the exogenous variable in a once-and-for-all
manner. This will affect the level of the variables involved,
whereas the growth rate of the variable will be left un-
changed. Second, one may pursue continuous macroecon-
omic policy plans, implying a gradual change in the differ-
ent exogenous variables. This will affect the growth rates of
the exogenous variables, and the levels will be affected indi-
rectly and continuously. Combinations of these two main
groups of alternatives are also perfectly possible, leaving us
with a large possible number of policy plans to be evalu-
ated. It is beyond this report to be totally exhaustive on this
point, and therefore we restrict ourselves to presenting the
implications of partial changes in the variables of our esti-
mated model. However, the implications of these
exogenous influences will be illustrated both for the dis-
crete and for the continuous case.
6.3 Discrete shocks in policy variables
The preferred estimated model includes broad money, the
terms of trade, and the interest rate as exogenous policy
variables. This opens for three partial one-shot experiments.
First, we hold the supply of money constant between 1993
and 1994, whereas the monetary growth rates are assumed
to remain unchanged (at an annual 25%) from 1995 to
2011. This alternative is referred to as "One-shot contrac-
tion of broad money" in figure 6.4. The second experiment
is to assume a discrete (10%) improvement in the terms of
trade index in 1994, whereas the modest deterioration of the
reference alternative is assumed to continue from 1995.
This alternative is referred to as "One-shot improvement in
the terms of trade" in figure 6.4. The third experiment in-
volves the interest rate, and here we assume a discrete in-
crease from 37 to 45 per cent in 1994, and that this level is
maintained throughout the period. This alternative is
referred to as "One-shot increase in interest rates" in figure
6.4.
As one might have expected, the impact of a contraction of
the supply of broad money is a reduction in the gross domes-
tic product, relatively to the reference scenario. The short-
term effect implies a 1.2 per cent reduction from the first to
the second year, whereas the long term effect of this experi-
ment seems to be a gross domestic product about 3.5 per
cent below the projection of the reference scenario. Further,
a discrete increase in the terms of trade produces an in-
crease in the level of activity, relatively to the base-line pro-
jection. As our model does not include short-term effects of
changes in the terms of trade index, the projection does not
react until the second year after the change, when the
lagged level has responded. Over the period, the effect of a
discrete 10 per cent increase in the terms of trade seems to
Reference scenario
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Figure 6.4 Simulated one -shot policy changes
Projected deviations in GDP level relative to the reference scenario (%)
4
Projected deviations in GDP level relative to the reference scenario (%)
be a gross domestic product about 3 per cent higher than in
the reference scenario. This illustrates the long-run positive
impact of restructuring the international trade pattern.
The third example illustrates the projected effects of a dis-
crete increase in the interest rate level from 1994, from an
annual 37 per cent in the reference scenario, to a constant
45 per cent in the present projection. As commented above,
this produces a significant contractive effect in the short
run, as the GDP growth rate falls from 5.6 to 4.0 per cent
from one year to another. However, the long-run structural
impact of increasing interest rates seems to be favourable,
again increasing annual GDP growth above the reference al-
ternative. After a five-year period, an increase in the interest
rate level has advantageous effects relative to the projected
reference every year of the period. This illustrates the long-
term gains that might occur if the capital markets are re-
structured to facilitate an efficient flow of domestic savings
towards domestic investments. The multinational donors are
devoted to these problems through their financial sector re-
form programmes, commented in chapter 2.
6.4 Continuous policy experiments
The second group of policy alternatives incorporate changes
in the growth rates of the different independent variables.
We still keep the reference alternative described above un-
changed, and the implications of the alternative policy plans
are measured as deviations from the reference scenario. The
measures will also still be restricted to three partial experi-
ments, each incorporating an isolated change in the growth
rate of the three independent variables. In the first experi-
ment we reduce the growth in the money supply from an an-
nual 25 per cent to an annual 20 per cent over the complete
period. This alternative is referred to as "reduced monetary
growth" in figure 6.5. Second, we keep the terms of trade
constant, in stead of extrapolating the deterioration assumed
in the reference alternative. This experiment is referred to
as "constant terms of trade" in figure 6.5. Finally, we let the
interest rate rise by 0.5 percentage points every year throug-
hout the period. This case is referred to as "interest rate in-
crease" in figure 6.5.
As expected, the reduction in the rate of growth in broad
money makes GDP growth slow down. By the end of the
period this experiment yields an annual gross domestic pro-
duct about 9 per cent below the projection of the reference
scenario. This deviation will also continue increasing, be-
cause the structural effect of this experiment implies an
ever-lasting negative deviation in the rate of economic
growth, again relative to the reference alternative. Figure
6.5 also illustrates how an improvement in the terms of
trade may produce an increase in the rates of growth, im-
plying a continuous increase also in the deviation presented
in the figure. As there are no short-term dynamic effects
connected to the terms of trade, the estimated structural ef-
fect of our model produces a undisputable positive effect on
the evolution in the gross domestic product.
However, this is not the case for the last policy experiment,
involving a continuous increase in the interest rates. As
chapter 5 illustrated, there seem to be adverse short-run ef-
fects connected with an increase in the interest rates. That
interest rates are negatively correlated with the level of ac-
tivity in the short run is not surprising, as this is the standard
hypothesis of Keynesian macroeconomic theory. On the
other hand, our model incorporates a positive long-run struc-
tural effect of increasing interest rates, and this is not in ac-
cordance with traditional macroeconomics. Figure 6.5 sug-
gests that the impact of an interest rate increase is negative
in the short run, but this negative influence is continuously
hindered by the positive structural effect. With our choice
of policy, the structural effect of interest rate increase seems
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to outweigh the negative dynamic effect only after about ten
years.
These experimental projections underscores the dilemma of
choosing the right macroeconomic policies; The positive ef-
fects of gradualism may be modest, and will often occur
with many years delay. However, the short term adverse ef-
fects of structural adjustment may be reduced to trifles if
gradualism is chosen. On the other hand, the one-shot
changes of the previous section may have serious short-
term adverse effects. Still the structural effects break
through at an earlier stage with this kind of policy, making
"cold turkey" strategies more efficient, when measured by
productive gains alone. Thus, to some extent one may un-
derstand those who claim gradualism to be slow and ineffi-
cient. But one should also remember that gradualism repre-
sents a much more considerate approach to the problems of
structural adjustment. The proper answers are therefore far
from evident. Social objectives and preferences concerning
the distribution of income may thus still make the gradual
approach best suited in pursuing the economic and political
plans of the government.
6.5 Accommodating monetary control
Our model includes a positive spill-over from nominal mag-
nitudes to real economic development through the trans-
mission mechanism for monetary impulses. This implies
that a contraction of the broad money supply has disadvant-
ageous effects on the real level of activity. On the other
hand, one should not jump to the conclusion that an expan-
sion of the broad money supply is the appropriate measure
to increase the rate of GDP growth. The reason is that our
model overlooks the adverse effects of high and increasing
rates of inflation. As discussed in chapter 2, inflation may
have severe consequences on domestic production, capital
movements, and interest rates. Our conclusions may be
looked upon as valid only for a given rate of inflation. Tar-
geting the broad money supply to reduce inflationary press-
ures may thus still have relevance. The final simulated ex-
periment is therefore constructed to illustrate the real effects
of reduced monetary growth, and to illuminate what
measures that might be taken to counteract these direct ne-
gative effects on domestic production. To illustrate the
ideas we construct a specially tailored experiment.
First, we let the annual rate of growth in the broad money
supply fall from 25 to 20 per cent from 1993 to 1994. From
1995 to 2004 the same annual growth rate is reduced by 0.5
percentage points every year. From 2004 to 2011, the mon-
etary growth rate is held constant at the resulting 15 per
cent per annum. In isolation, this measure produces a con-
traction in the gross domestic product when measured rela-
tively to the reference scenario. If the production level is to
be maintained, the control of the money supply will there-
fore have to be followed by appropriate accommodating
measures. To illustrate this, we first let the terms of trade
index improve at a rate of 2.5 per cent in 1994, and this rate
of improvement is then assumed to fall gradually towards
an annual 1 per cent in 2011. Finally, the interest rate is in-
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creased gradually to 50 per cent over the first three years,
and is then held constant throughout the period. The impli-
cations for the level and growth of GDP are illustrated in
figures 6.6 and 6.7, respectively.
From figure 6.6 we observe that the reference scenario
yields a higher GDP level than the policy experiment for
the first five years after the implementation of policy
measures. Also GDP growth rates are higher for the refer-
ence alternative, but only for the first two years. These re-
sults are due to the short-term adverse effects of the in-
crease in interest rates, which are at work together with the
reduced monetary growth. However, the growth rates of our
policy experiment picks up by 1996, and when measured in
terms of economic growth, the alternative dominates the ref-
erence scenario from then and throughout the period. For
the level of activity, this simulated policy experiment im-
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Figure 6.8 Benefits of the comptex polity;experiment
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plies a higher gross domestic product than the reference al-
ternative for every year after 1999.
Figure 6.8 illustrates the projected benefits of our complex
policy experiment. Compared to real world experience, the
applied policy measures are not especially dramatic. None-
theless, it takes 3 years to improve on the growth rates, and
6 years to improve on the GDP levels of the reference alter-
native. This illuminates the sluggishness of the estimated
model, a feature which is likely to characterize also the ac-
tual functioning of the macroeconomy in developing coun-
tries. If the macroeconomy respond largely to lagged
changes and levels of different macroeconomic indicators,
instead of their current values, the economy will typically
be sluggish in its response to external shocks and policy
changes. The error-correction formulation of our single-equ-
ation econometric model is one example of such mechan-
isms. This should also remind us of the pittance which is re-
quired in evaluating implemented macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion plans for countries such as Mozambique.
The presented simulations should not under any circum-
stance be taken as literal projections of the evolution of the
Mozambican economy. Rather, they should be considered
as illustrative examples of macroeconomic mechanisms
which may be of relevance for the design of economic pol-
icy. It has not escaped our attention that there are numerous
factors which affect the growth of an economy, and that our
estimated equation only captures a minimal fraction of
these. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the above exposition
will stimulate stringent and empirically oriented thoughts
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7. Conclusions
The design of appropriate macroeconomic structural adjust-
ment policies for developing countries remains a complex
and highly debated issue. Many reasons may contribute to
the explanation of the background for this debate. First, the
multinational donor community offers integrated structural
adjustment programmes which can be criticized for being
stereotype, and inconsiderate with respect to country-spe-
cific variations in political, economic and social conditions.
This is especially relevant for Mozambique, as this country
is extremely poor and debt-ridden, also by World Bank
standards. In addition, a relatively standard structural adjust-
ment programme was implemented in the domestically un-
stable situation which accompanied the civil war of the
1980's. The macroeconomy of Mozambique has thus lite-
rally been worlds apart from the model economies of the
multinational donor community. One can not expect an
economy like this to respond to external shocks in the same
way as other developing countries, not to mention the econ-
omies of the industrialized world.
Second, the structural adjustment programmes often take a
long-term view of the macroeconomy, trying to improve the
general structure over a number of years. In addition, many
of the recommended changes in policy have short-term ad-
verse effects, and these tend to harm a population already
struggling with extreme poverty. For countries like Mozam-
bique this may be provoking, considering the urgency of
this country's economic and social needs. As stressed by the
ANC in their thoughts on macroeconomic plans for post-
apartheid South-Africa, it might be time to introduce a more
significant social profile to the restructuring efforts in Af-
rica (cf. Tjdnneland [1990]). Looking back on the 1980's,
the "trickle-down" effects from a general increase in econ-
omic growth has not been convincing. To ensure the via-
bility of economic reforms the long-term restructuring
should therefore be accommodated by appropriate short-
term measures, to secure a minimum consumption level for
all the population, but in particular the poor. This also re-
sembles the recent recognition from the designers of reform
policies for Russia.
Third, the effects of many of the policy measures that have
been applied in the adjustment programmes are hampered
by the sluggishness of the macroeconomic mechanisms in
developing countries. The simple simulations of chapter 6
have illustrated how sluggish the macroeconomy may re-
spond to exogenous shocks and policy changes if economic
agents respond to lagged macroeconomic indicators instead
of their updated current values. In evaluating the results of
structural adjustment this should be taken into consider-
ation. As stressed by policy designers, and by the analysis
above, it may take many years to reach the final turnaround
in a destabilized and underdeveloped economy like e.g. Mo-
zambique.
Thus, future policy plans should be increasingly tailored,
taking proper account of the country-specific properties of
the economy, in addition to general features and character-
istics of the macroeconomy in developing countries. Fur-
ther, the feasibility of structural adjustment should be in-
creasingly secured through proper short-term measures, to
soften the short-term adverse effects of structural adjust-
ment, and to guarantee a minimum consumption level for
transfer-deserving households. Finally, the implementation
of restructuring should be accompanied by general informa-
tion, reflecting the government's commitment to the macro-
economic policy. This might improve the understanding of
the needs for structural adjustment, and reduce the general
impatience in a population expecting real improvements in
their standards of living.
In many cases, the success of structural adjustment hinges
critically on the policy-designers' ability to smooth the tran-
sition to a sustainable path of development. This requires an
overview of the consequences of alternative policy plans,
and optimal decision-making will therefore depend criti-
cally on advisory support on as many as possible of the
problems of concern. One useful device for this type of
economic and political planning is a mathematical imitation
of economic mechanisms, or more precise, an empirically-
based model of the macroeconomy. This will make it pos-
sible to estimate the quantitative effects of different policy
measures and other external shocks to the economy, and
could thus be an important piece of support to the designers
of economic policy. Although a macroeconomic model will
not provide the precise answers to all problems involved by
structural adjustment, this kind of integrated framework can
contribute to a better understanding of the underlying mac-
roeconomic mechanisms of a developing economy, and
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